

Saddam Hussein, the Fighter, the Thinker and the Man

Part II

Religion and heritage - Revolutionary reflections

By Amir Eskander

Translated by Hassan Selim

Chapter 2

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, there has followed, in the wake of the sharp shock of colonialist penetration of the Arab World, an ambivalent attitude towards its heritage.

This is because this attitude was forced to pause and consider the "other", and therefore tried to define its own self. In this attempt it was forced to answer the questions, which it posed itself: What was its past? In what way was it connected to it? In what sense was it possible that its essence should be part of historical continuity that began at a point in the distant past? In what sense could it cut itself off from that continuity, and be cut off from it? Is the present a continuation of the past, or does history refuse to repeat itself?

There is no doubt but that the attempt to answer such questions does not, and has not hitherto, preoccupied more than a few of the traditional scholars and religious lawyers, yet it has begun to attract, particularly in the years following the Second World War, a continually increasing number of researchers and intellectuals of differing intellectual viewpoints. But perhaps it is difficult even today to find a political party that has a serious programme concerning the matter of religion and heritage either as regards the Arab identity as a whole or that of a particular area. Generally speaking, the two most important events to occur in recent years may be said to be the defeat of the Arabs in the June 1967 war and the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

After the Arab humiliation of 1967, some intellectuals claimed that salvation for Arab society lay only in a return to the pristine springs of Islam, after its deviation from the upright path for the sake of materialist values" It had estranged itself from the values of its religion and its heritage, and this was the cause of its defeat.

In 1972, for instance, Shaikh Abd al-Halim Mahmud, the grand Imam of al-Azhar, wrote a series of articles, which he published in the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram. He claimed in these articles that the root of the affliction was Greek philosophy, particularly Aristotle, European philosophy in general, particularly Descartes, and the Arab philosophers headed by Averroes (Abul Walid Mahommed Ibn Ahmed, Ibn Mahommed Ibn Roshd). In his opinion, all these caused the decay of the Islamic heritage, which God had sent al-Ghazali to defend. The solution proposed by the Imam of al-Azhar was a return to the Islamic spring that cannot run dry; whose constitution is the Koran. "Its message is eternal. It is the straight path, the everlasting guidance (1)."

To turn to the view put forward by Hussein Shafi'i who was Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt: "The only society that can challenge Israel is the society of 'There is no God but God' (2)." In the same month a high-ranking official in the Arab Socialist Union, Muhammad Othman Isma'il, said in a leading Cairo newspaper: "We preoccupy ourselves with Sinai, but not with our religion (3)."

We need not be indebted to those who put forward such views, or even to the views themselves. Their intellectual viewpoint towards the heritage is limited by their perception of it. It must be made clear that they do not search for the heritage for its own sake. They do not defend it because of God, their country or history: it is an ideological weapon used by this group of intellectuals and politicians for reactionary political ends.

At the other extreme we meet a group of intellectuals who reject the religious heritage. We hear Sadiq Jallal al-Azam, an Arab thinker from Lebanon, writing in his book 'A Critique of Religious Thought', "Islam has become the official ideology of the reactionary forces in the Arab homeland and outside it, connected with the new Imperialism led by America. In the same way, religion has become the principal source of justification for rule by kings, as Islamic jurisconsults have declared that the right of kings comes from Heaven and not from the earth. It has also become the chief ally today of bourgeois capitalism so that it, together with the institutions it has created, has become a bastion of right-wing and reactionary thought (4)." He goes on to say, "Religion, when it enters the depths of our lives and influences our intellectual and psychological composition, contradicts science and empirical knowledge through and through...(5)".

Let us read Adonis, another writer: "Inasmuch as Arabic Culture, in its prevailing inherited form, has a religious foundation which is a social formulation, it rejects innovation. This culture changes in its prevailing inherited form without making any real advance (6)." He goes on to say, attempting to lay bare the courses of reactionary thought in Arab society, criticizing al-Ghazali: "Al-Ghazali's thought is that which governs the beliefs and aims of Arab society today. Therefore, the prevailing ideology in schools, universities, television, broadcasting and books is a force for retreat into the past and the preservation of the inherited status quo. (7)"

When the Iranian Revolution took place under the banner of religion and in the religious robes of its leadership, it showed the lack of firm conviction in some of its intellectual leaders and their representatives who left one intellectual position for its antithesis. A number of Arab writers with Marxist principles formed a chorus singing night and day the praises of the Iranian Revolution and its religious leadership. It was not the fall of the Shah and his reactionary State that surprised them but the sudden discovery that religion, because of the nature of the new Iranian leadership, was the cause of the Revolution. This led Adonis to say, "Something which some of us had thought was outside history, suddenly seemed to enter its wide gate and become its prime mover. What some of us had thought was moribund, now appears as though it alone is enduring, revolutionary and modern)".

Adonis of course, was not alone. The long line contained some of those whom the present Arab state of affairs, and the quiescent picture it gave, led to see salvation in the robes of a man of religion cursing America and imperialism. It also contained traditionalists who wished to return to the Caliphate system, which breathed its last gasp with the "sick man of Europe" in 1924. Yet this time it had a new name: the Imam, the Ruhullah, or the Ayatollah. A third group in this line wished to fight Arab nationalism under the banner of the Islamic community, Islamic unity and Islamic ideology. The attempt made now by the imperialist states to enflame religious strife in some of our Arab countries is not without significance in this regard. The belated discovery by the imperialist states, especially the U.S.A., of the importance of "Islamic" civilization, and the string of conferences in American universities and Western research centres on Islamic civilization, is the most recent sign of the age-old imperialist exploitation of religion and its attempt to strengthen its existing positions and to gain new ones under its cloak. There is no doubt that this attempt at exploitation goes back more than a century, both directly and indirectly. This takes the form of a naked attack on Islam by a small-or large-handful of orientalists, missionaries and university professors, or of

an attempt to stir up strife between the members of different religions and of different sects of one religion inside the Arab homeland. We cannot forget that Napoleon proclaimed himself a Muslim in Cairo during the French attack on Egypt, how Great Britain caused discord between Muslims and Copts during the occupation of the Nile valley, how France acted as an imperialist in order to tear Lebanon from Syria, especially in the crisis of 1860, and how the two old imperialist powers tried to inflame religious minorities in Iraq, the Arabian Gulf, and all North Africa. One of the uncommon achievements of imperialism was that great orientalists such as Massignon could write a book on 'The Arabic Dialects of Baghdad'; in which he speaks of the differences in the "languages" of the Sunni, Shiite and Christian inhabitants of Baghdad.

Saddam Hussein's article 'On Religion and Heritage' assumes great importance for all these questions. This is not only because it is a far-reaching attempt to put our heads back on our shoulders, but because it is an important intellectual and political addition to the national Arab heritage in the modern age, and to the intellectual and political heritage of the Arab Baath Socialist Party itself.

It is the contribution of a man who is not only an intellectual and political leader but also a statesman with his hands on the reins of power in one of the most important parts of the Arab homeland.

We must say first that the Arab Baath Socialist Party is a party that has a secular philosophy and a nationalist nature, and that the Baathist State in Iraq is a secular and nationalist state both in theory and practice. But this nationalist nature and secular inclination have not cut it off from religion and heritage. On the contrary, but for its nationalist essence and secular inclination it might not have been possible for it to adopt its position of link between the present and the past of the nation.

The founder of the Baath, Michel Aflaq, and states: "Our Party has from the very beginning sought inspiration in our Arab heritage our spiritual heritage. This is abundantly clear in all the writings and slogans of the Party, especially in the slogan 'Our nation is one with an eternal message' (9)." The lecture which he at Damascus University early in his career in 1943 which he published under the title ' In Commemoration of the Arab Prophet' is an example of how Baathist thought from the very beginning sought revolutionary inspiration from the heritage. In his lecture he analyzed the essence of Islam and the essence of the personality of the Prophet as an exceptional leader and great revolutionary. He strove to establish a strong link between them and us and to show the eternal heroism and humanity, which are of relevance for us today and guide us on the right path. He saw in the life of Muhammad greatness able to embrace the life of all the Arabs: "Muhammad was all the Arabs. Let all Arabs today be Muhammad. (10)

He also said, "Satisfaction with our national heritage does not mean unqualified worship of the past and traditions, or a languidness in the spirit of creativity (11)".

This was because "to seek to understand the eternal experiment in the life of the Arab nation means an attempt to understand the unique achievement and the human impulses and values that are revolutionary, but which do not bestow upon the nation rights and distinctions to the extent of the great responsibility borne by the modern revolution (12)". This was a sentiment which all intellectual and political leaders of the Baath were to affirm at all times, and to which Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr gave an inspired and concise expression: "Be modern so long as you remain rooted. Modernism does not imply the severance of roots (13)."

The past does not become an idol, or the heritage a cold, dead corpse to whom those who worship the dead prostrate themselves. Rather, "the present is not the mere continuation of the

past. The result of any situation is an eternal moment (14)". As Elias Farah, one of the Baathist thinkers, put it "The revivification of the heritage does not imply a return to the past. It implies an understanding of the heritage in a scientific, revolutionary way in the light of the requirements of the struggle of the Arab nation in its present stage of history (15)."

Michel 'Aflaq returns to this theme more than once in his writings. "We do not turn to the heritage as do the traditionalists for sake of repetition and tradition-the repetition of Words and unprofitable tradition. We look at the heritage from our age and its civilization, and then we look at its problems and its backwardness. But our eyes are new; we do not demand from the heritage that it should be a substitute for the struggle, which we must begin. We have lived through the modern Revolution with all its demands, and we have found beyond it our heritage, which gives us roots. No revolution or contemporary philosophy can replace them. It is this understanding of the heritage that enables the Party to derive a spiritual and moral strength from it, on which other governments cannot rely (6)." He affirmed later the Importance for the Revolution of attachment to the heritage and of the dialectic between the present and the past: "We can only understand the heritage when we struggle (17)"

This, then, is the nature of the inner link-in Baathists thought-between the present and the past, modernity and the heritage. It is not a case of retreat under the illusion of salvation in the past alone. On the other hand it is not a flight from the past in its totality in order to cling to an imaginary future cut off from roots, or a selective fabrication of history. It is the full revolutionary possession of the heritage, which can only be achieved by revolutionary activity that liberates both the masses, and the heritage at the same time.

Saddam Hussein affirms at the beginning of his lecture that "our creed is not a union of all that the past and religion involve; it is a comprehensive and developed view of life and a comprehensive solution to constrictions and tenets. It pushes life forward on the road of revolutionary evolution (18)". "It is a reflection of the present of our nation, but is anterior to it at the same time (19)."

If the past still exists in the present and influences it, the question of "values" must become irrelevant. How can the values that existed in the past influence the present in the same way and through the same perspective? In other words, can values change their form and content according to time and place and the evolution of societies? To put it in a nutshell: are social values absolute or relative?

Saddam Hussein replies clearly that social values are "sophisticated, objective standards (20)", but absolute and relative at the same time. They are "absolute in respect of the shaping of development in the successive stages of human existence (21)", but relative "in an estimation of a comprehensive view of life in its general movement in isolation of the particularities of time and place and other limiting factors (22)".

Nevertheless, there are of course those who will call the relative absolute and clothe the temporal with the garments of eternity. This is a result of the state of a backward society and its long subservience to forces of colonialism and reaction. Consciously or not, they eventually solidify whatever is sterile in the present and deprive it of its dynamism and power to grow and develop. Sometimes they do this in the name of the heritage of the past and its traditions. At other times they do it in the name of religion. Saddam Hussein tells them with a biting clarity, "Our Party is not neutral between atheism and faith. It is always on the side of faith, but it is not a religious Party and there is no reason why it should be (23)".

But the rejectionists who seek salvation only through the past under the illusion that it can be repeated go to the lengths of blind, hateful partisanship. They make themselves guardians of society and its present in the name of its past. This had happened in the West as well as in our

Arab societies, only centuries ago. The imaginary tale told by Dostoevsky in 'The Brothers Karamazov' is a good example. Dostoevsky wanted to show how the "Creed" could be turned into a dreadful idol, as it was by the cardinals and priests of the Spanish Inquisition that tortured hundreds to death in Seville. The courts of the Inquisition were headed by a Cardinal whose name was dreaded because of his power to execute any man on the grounds that he was a heretic—a heretic as understood by the Cardinal, of course. One day the people of the city were surprised to find that Christ had appeared on earth a second time. They knew that this was in fact Christ because of his halo and the miracles that he worked in front of the people. They would bring him a sick child, he would touch it and say, and "Rise up", and it would rise up at once. The fearful Cardinal came, and all hearts were hushed. He saw with his own eyes the Christ surrounded by people at prayer. The mantle of religion fell from his brow and his bloodstained face became apparent. Christ approached the Cardinal, and religion faced the man of religion in front of the people. Christ gazed on the man who had killed in the name of Christianity, and the Cardinal knew that Christ pronounced him guilty. So the Cardinal had him imprisoned: the "Christian" Cardinal put Christ himself behind bars, then preached on how Christianity was persecuted on the pain borne by Cardinals in order to prevent it. He visited Christ in order to explain to him how Christianity itself had changed, and how its new characteristics were known to the minds of men. Eventually he came to the purpose of his visit: to tell him how the presence of Christ in the city involved a great danger for Christianity; how Christ had himself become a threat to Christianity. In other words, Christ was no longer The Christ. The high point of the comedy was that he asked Christ to leave the city at once, as an alternative to standing trial for heresy. The Cardinal himself unlocked his fetters. Alyosha, Dostoevsky's hero in his "Sad Dream", saw him leave, weighed down by indescribable grief, banished from the city, his city.

How should this bigotry, this oppression of religion, be faced?

There are two ways, both tactical and short-term. The first is "generalization and obscurantism" for the consumption of the majority. It has to be directed towards the short-term and can only be used for a short period in order to get through a temporary predicament. Saddam Hussein has publicly repudiated this: "We do not want to use [such methods] to achieve any short-term goal. Such are the tactics of the reactionaries and the oppressive classes in their relations with the masses. All that we want is that the majority of the people should be on our side at all times. The deep-rooted and essential treatment for the problems of the people and their basic social and economic environment is to keep well-away from generalization and obscurantism and to be concerned with specific goals and the active forces that are on the side of the Revolution at the moment in the struggle when the enemies of the Revolution and their allies are identified (24)."

The other way is to do battle with the enemy and to have a temporary meeting with him on his own territory in the hope of influencing him and leading him on the right path. Saddam Hussein rejects this tactical approach as well, since "you must always be clearly distinguished from the enemy when you face him and hope to vanquish him in those situations when you are leading the people.

There must be open ground between you and him so that you do not enter his trenches, and sufficient distance for you to get him in your gun-sights when you fire your gun. But you should not use cold steel or unarmed combat in your struggle (25)".

What, then, is necessary to repel religious and sectarian fanaticism in our day? The two ways that have already been discussed are wrong. Clarity and pointedness are very necessary "so that we become deep-rooted and make the role of our Party that of leader in moving and changing society (26) ".

To blur men's understanding and to enter the enemy trenches would "lose us the battle and inflict on us a defeat that would leave us open to an intellectual crisis at a time when we were the losers politically, so that we would lose twice: the political ground where we are grouped, and our intellectual integrity. We would lose our struggle (27)".

But is the repudiation of religion the necessary solution to the dilemma? No. (28).

Saddam Hussein courageously puts the ideal solution, the true strategic and revolutionary solution, forward: "What we must do is to oppose the institutionalization of religion in the state and in society-and also to oppose letting the Revolution intrude into religion. Let us return to the roots of our religion, glory in them-but not bring it into politics (29)."

The conclusion to be drawn is that we should hold fast to the ideal of a popular, secular state, raised above sectarian differences. All citizens of whatever creed are equal in the eyes of the state. One citizen can only have merit superior to another because of his attachment to the country and the Revolution, and his effort in the building of a new society. Let each citizen believe what he likes of the Books of Heaven, and belong to whatever earthly creed he chooses.

We must remember that the solution Saddam Hussein proposes is the implementation of one of the basic principles in all declarations of the rights of man for which humanity has long striven and paid the price of the deaths of millions of martyrs. For that principle to be implemented here in Iraq, where there are a number of religious minorities and groupings, assumes a special significance as Iraq is on the point of being one of the few Third World and Arab countries that meet the problem of religions and other minorities in this way.

The state that engages in a political struggle disguised as religious, or in a religious struggle disguised as political, will eventually lose the unity of its people. No matter which side wins in such a religious struggle, it becomes the state of only a portion of its citizens, a minority state. It is bad for a state and its institutions to be embroiled in a struggle that appears to be between the proponents and opponents of religion. The modern state is not an apparatus for guiding and preaching to the people; its leaders are not new cardinals distributing indulgences or withholding them. These battles in Third

World and Arab countries and societies are a wide gate for Imperialism and foreign influence to enter the country. It is rare to find one of these societies in which the leaders engage in such religious struggles without finding that the hand of Imperialism has been pouring oil and kindling the fire.

Saddam Hussein has said, "Political entry into religious matters leads to a division of the people--not only into those who are religious and those who are not, but into the different adherents of different religions, distinguished from each other by their religious life and practice (30)".

It must not escape us that one of the main causes of the enfeeblement and then the dismemberment of the great undivided Arab State that existed in early Islam was the division between its inhabitants and the rift in its unity caused by the different religious groupings that numbered more than twenty: Sunnis, Shiites, Alawis, Zaidis,

Shafi'is, Druses, Ibadis, Isma'ilis and the rest, including the early Murji'is, Mu'tazilis, Kharijis and Batinis. In those days human differences were expressed in religious terms. Despite the greatness of some of the leaders, their flowing robes covered political and social struggles. As one of the modern Arab writers who preach "One Islam " has put it, all the events that led to the appearance of these groupings "were human events and differences. A few of them were religious, but the majority political and social. Even the religious ones were really political

and social differences masquerading as religious (31)". He continues, "We cannot transform the battlefields of a thousand years ago into Islamic constitutions that discriminate in favour of one particular sect, or distinguish between the followers of different sects by writing each man's sect on his identity card. Islam is one and has no sects (32)".

Even when you are unable to unite a society you should not have recourse to apostasy or feigned conversion.

Saddam Hussein is well aware of this and says, "Giving way for religious reasons to reactionary calls involves giving up your role as leader of society, embodied in a revolutionary movement that is creating a new present and looks towards the future in clear and unambiguous ways. To renounce it and stand in the ranks of a reactionary movement that only looks to the past means that you must begin again from the bottom of the ladder (33)".

It is unwise to follow a reactionary movement in the hope of subverting it and freeing it of its poison, as "the religious reactionaries will be the leaders, not you. Every pathway has its leaders, and therefore it will not be you that leads the masses along this path, so you will not be able to divert them in the direction you want (34)".

We should add that when Saddam Hussein emphasized that the state should not force a religion or a sect on its subjects, he persistently refused any accommodation of a temporary or technical nature with the reactionaries, and rejected equally the opposite extreme, which is to proclaim or encourage agnosticism. He always affirmed that the state must have a firm and principle attitude to this sensitive matter that is liable to flare up quickly in any society. He was very conscious of two important things: firstly, that generally speaking the reactionaries are the side to start these battles--some would say that they always are--and secondly, that if the state is neutral and abandons religious struggles to the protagonists, Imperialism will always be lying in wait behind the gates, and the state may be unable to provide leadership on the right path.

As regards the first, Saddam Hussein says: "Let us tell everyone to practice his own religion, and not interfere with it. But the condition for this is that no one should quarrel on religious grounds with the policies of the Arab Baath Socialist Party. They must not cloak politics with the veil of religion or with anything else that conflicts with the Revolution and its goals: for that could only help the new imperialism (35)." As regards the second matter, Saddam Hussein affirms the necessity for education, training and culture. Here the factors of the particular age are important, on condition that they are not used for neutral gradualism but methodical gradualism. "With his conscious will, man plays a central role in it (36)." He says, "You must accept the guardianship of the factors of the particular age. But take care that the reins do not slip from your hand, and do not let the factors of the age be exploited by others--for then your role will become secondary, and you will lose the leadership (37)".

When the main keys that will guarantee the movement of destiny in its true path have all been gathered, and we are able to use the factors of our age with perspicacity, caution and responsibility in the dynamic construction of a new society for all the people and by all the people, "then there will be no fear of the external enemy waiting behind the fence (38)".

It is taking pride in religion without being embroiled in the politics of religion, having faith while playing no part in sectarian struggles, and holding fast to the spiritual kernel that consists of the fight for goodness, justice, sacrifice and progress and is central to the Islamic message "in a new framework designed for new development and progress (39)".

Saddam Hussein sees quite rightly that the problems of the modern society in which we live are fundamentally different, as are the solutions, from those which society faced at the dawn

of Islam, when the Religious Law of Islam was formulated. The progress of modern life involves a reversal of some old laws that caused splits to appear in the Muslim community and enable imperialism to divide the Arabs and to turn the goals of the Revolution and the nationhood of the Arabs into a mirage (40).

Let us cite a recent example of how reactionaries attempt to subvert social progress by appealing to these old laws. On the 25th March 1974, the Egyptian Ministry of Social Affairs published a proposal to amend the law of individual rights. It asked intellectuals, lawyers and men of opinion to consider the proposals, stating that it intended to put them before the People's Assembly for debate and enactment as law. What happened? On the

30th of March-after only four days-a Congress of Religious Doctors at al-Azhar University rejected the proposals on the grounds that "legislation in matters of individual rights is properly a concern of al-Azhar, not of the Ministry of Social Affairs or the People's Assembly (41)".

The proposals concerned the rights of women, but the members of the Congress demonstrated afterwards so that their anger at the undermining of the right to legislate in religious law should be made known.

The European reader will be amazed to see that in the late twentieth century we still discuss and demonstrate--both reactionaries and progressives-on matters that were largely settled in Europe by the "Bourgeois Revolution" that began with the French Revolution. But he might remember that such reactionary positions and demonstrations are part of the backwardness in which European Imperialism has kept us. To plunder our mineral wealth and turn our lands into mere providers of raw materials and markets for its industrial goods are not its only aims. The sowing of religious dissension is one of the methods by which it turns the people of the area against each other and then plunders the raw materials and human resources with ease. The plundering of the Arab people, and the sterilization of their potentialities and prevention of them taking their rightful place in humanity are also fundamental aims, as is the quick and permanent suppression of any national revolution. These are the Arab people who produced a great and human civilization at a time when Europe was in darkness and its priests and cardinals were concerned solely with selling Paradise to those who could pay the most money. It was necessary for that Europe to die so that the modern Western and European civilization could flourish and the people of Europe enjoy material refinement.

But the Arab people, with all their immense potentialities and their intimate connection with their faith and heritage, are rising up once again, despite the yoke of Imperialism and reactionary suppression.

They are struggling now to discard the burden of their "Middle Ages" and to build a new civilization that will be both Arab and humanist.

Notes

- 1) See al-Ahram (Cairo newspaper), a series of articles entitled Sarab wa Ma' (Mirage and Water), 20-10-1972.
- 2) See al-Jumhuriyya (Iraqi newspaper), 22-11-1972.
- 3) Announced in a council meeting of The Arab Socialist Union, 1972.
- 4) Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, Naqd al-Fjkr ad-Djnj (The Criticism of Religious Thought), Beirut, Dar al-Tali'a, 1969, p. 24.

- 5) Ibid., p. 21.
- 6) Adonis, ath-Thabjt wat-Mutahawwil (The Fixed and the Changing), Dar al-Awda, 1974, pp. 27-34.
- 7) Adonis, Khawatjr Hawla Madhahjr at- Takhalluf al-Fjkri fil-Mujtama'a al-Arabi (Thoughts on the Aspects of Intellectual Backwardness in Arab Society), paper given in the Kuwait Council meeting in 1974 on The Crisis of Arab Cultural Development, and published by al-Adab magazine, Beirut, May 1974, p. 27.
- 8) Adonis, al-Nahar al-Arabi Wad-duwalli (newspaper), Paris, 22-1-1979.
- 9) Michel Aflaq, al-Ba'ath wat-Turath (The Baath and Heritage), Baghdad, Dar al-Huriyya, 1977, p. 10.
- 10) Michel ' Aflaq, FjiSabil al-Baath (Thjkra ar-Rasul al-Arabi), Towards the Baath (In Memory of The Arab Prophet), Beirut, Dar al-Tali'a, 1976, p. 126.
- 11) Ibid., p. 79.
- 12) Michel ' Aflaq, al-Baath wa Tahaddiyat al-Mustaqbal (The Baath and the Challenges of the Future), Baghdad, Dar al-Huriyya, 1977, p. 10.
- 13) Ahmad Hassan Bakr, al-Mawrid (Iraqi Magazine), dedication to the magazine.
- 14) Elias Farah, al-Fikr al-Arabi ath-Thawri Amam Tahadiyyat al-Marhala (Revolutionary Arab Thought and The Challenges of The Stage), Beirut, al-Mu'assasa al-Arabiyya lil-Dirasat wal-Nashr, p. 34.
- 15) Elias Farah, Muhawjr Ra'isiyya fit-Turath (Major Central Issues in the Heritage), an interview with ath-Thawra newspaper, 11-7-1976.
- 16) Michel Aflaq, al-Baath wat-Turath, p. 14.
- 17) Ibid., p. 87.
- 18) Saddam Hussein, Nadhra fid-Djn wat-Turath (A Look at Religion and Heritage), Dar al-Huriyya (Revolution publications), 1978, p. 3.
- 19) Ibid.
- 20) Ibid., p. 4.
- 21) Ibid., pp. 4-5.
- ٢٢) Ibid., p. 5.
- 23) Ibid.
- 24) Ibid., p. 6.
- 25) Ibid., p. 7.
- 26) Ibid., p. 8.
- 27) Ibid., p. 9.
- 28) Ibid., p. 10.

29) Ibid., pp. 12-13.

30) Ibid., p. 26.

31) Ahmad Baha' ad-Din, ad-Da'wa ila Islam Wahid (The Call for one Islam), al-Mustaqbal magazine, Paris, 22-12-1979.

32) Ibid.

33) Saddam Hussein, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

34) Ibid., p. 19.

35) Ibid., p. 22.

36) Ibid., p. 28.

37) Ibid., p. 29.

38) Ibid., p. 27.

39) Ibid., p. 17.

40) Ibid., p. 15.

41) See Muhammad al-Nuwayhi, ad-Din wa Azmat at-Tattawur al-Hadhari (Religion and The Crisis of The Development of Civilisation), al-Adab magazine, Beirut, May 1974, p. 79.