Pertinent problems and questions
From the Al-Moharer archives
(III)
There is another aspect of our conception that merits reflection and analysis, even if it is necessary to insist on it. We believe that if we ignore one of the aspects of the situation for any reason whatsoever, we cannot arrive at what is termed a just and lasting peace, which is the objective of those who have accepted the two resolutions of the Security Council.
This is the question: why did all the regimes of the neighbors of the Zionist entity and of all the other Arab regions refuse to recognize this entity for twenty five years and endure all that they endured as a result of this refusal? Why do they now express their desire to recognize it on the condition that resolution 242, voted by the Security Council in 1967, to be applied?
When the creation of what is called the State of Israel was announced on May 15, 1948, the great powers and scores of countries with diverse political orientations recognized this state. The Arab government, instead of recognizing it, went to war with it, and even though this war did not lead to the elimination of the Zionist entity and the liberation of the usurped Arab land, all the Arab governments maintained their original stand and refused to recognize this State.
At this time, these states were not free to act as a function of their national aspirations. Egypt and Iraq were held to a treaty, which made them dependent on Great Britain, who maintained military bases in the two countries. Jordan was more or less a British protectorate.
Syria had just obtained its independence and rid itself of French colonialism, but it was still suffering from the serious after-effects of foreign domination. The other Arab countries and regimes were not in a better situation, their situations were in fact worse.
The end of the war of 1948 brought important changes to the region, particularly in Syria and then in Egypt. New regimes and new forces came to power. Some have remained, as in Egypt, where the regime established by the revolution of July 23, 1952, is still strong. Others, such as in Syria, have changed several times. Nevertheless, over a long period of time, their position of the question of recognition of the Zionist entity did not change.
What is important is that the new regimes in power in Egypt and Syria after 1948 as well as the other Arab regimes, whether they have changed or not, did not modify their original position: non-recognition of the Zionist entity.
Naturally, the refusals to recognize the Zionist entity, leaving aside the seriousness of the governments in the past and their real desire to demonstrate this seriousness in a struggle for liberation against the Zionist entity, were never for a moment empty words. Since its creation, the Zionist entity has considered this simple refusal to recognize it a hostile attitude and a sufficient pretext for aggression against its neighbors and occupation of new territories. The great powers, for their part, did not look favorably on the Arab position. Certain of those among them, particularly the colonial powers who had control over a number of Arab states, tried to pressure them into changing their position, reconciling themselves with the Zionist entity, and recognizing and establishing relations with it. This was also the attitude of the United Nations.
In the 1950’s the Zionist enemy committed two aggressions against Egypt: one in 1955 and the other in 1956. The second, in which France and Great Britain participated, led to the occupation of the Sinai. The same thing happened eleven years later, in 1967. During the 50’s and the 60’s the enemy also committed a series of more or less violent aggressions against Syria and Jordan.
Despite all this, the official position of the Arabs on the question of recognition remained the same, and no exterior force was able to impose its modification.
The price of the determination not to change this position has not been limited to occasional Zionist aggression; it has reached considerable proportions, and for a quarter of a century has necessitated enormous expenditures for defense and armaments, which has without a doubt disadvantaged the economies of the Arab countries in general and the neighbors of the Zionist entity in particular.
Today, twenty five years later, after one of the neighbors of the Zionist entity (Egypt) has fought four wars with the enemy, in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973; a second (Syria) has fought three wars, in 1948, 1973; and a third (Jordan) has fought two, 1948 and 1967, the governments of these regions have declared themselves ready to recognize the Zionist entity on the conditions that the two resolutions voted by the Security Council in November, 1967 and October, 1973, be applied.
Naturally, we must weigh the importance of the effects of the June ‘67 aggression; we know that last twenty five years have brought events and multiple transformations to the region and the world, we recognize the importance of the results of last month’s war, and we are aware that the most recent resolution of the Security Council is not a resolution like those that preceded it, that it was voted on the initiative of the world’s two super powers and has their guarantees.
Even though we are aware of all importance of all this, we cannot refrain from asking the following questions:
1 - Do the governments in question think that their previous position was mistaken, and that it must now be modified?
2 - Have new elements altered the balance of military forces to our disadvantage so that the recognition of the Zionist entity has become inevitable?
3 - Are the military, economic and other capacities of the Arab regions bordering on the Zionist entity and the countries that support them now inferior to what they were in the past, obliging the former governments to recognize the Zionist enemy?
4 - Was the world situation more favorable to us in the previous stages of the conflict than it is now, and have we been driven to a choice between modifying our position and continuing to resist those who do not understand us?
5 - Do the resolutions of the Security Council offer us advantages that we did not have in the past?
6 - Are those who accept this new position convinced that it is just, or have they been forced, for avowed or secret reasons, to accept it?
We are not prepared to answer the first question, and we do not want to discuss it here. Besides, our manner of asking this question submits it to the judgment of the parties involved, the governments who have modified their attitude. It is up to them to answer it before the people of their respective countries and the Arab nation.
As for the other questions, although the governments mentioned above are certainly better qualified than we are to answer them precisely, we believe that they treat subjects which can be discussed without interfering in the rights or legitimate powers of any of the parties. In addition, this kind of debate hills under the category of freedom of discussion, to which every person and every group of people have the right. However, we will for our part try to limit our comments to points of no —or minimal— disagreement.
Concerning the second question:
On the purely military level (leaving aside the balance of power) all the indexes and official Arab information during the first phase of the war of 1948 tilted the scale towards the side of the enemy. In addition, it is common knowledge that the policy of maintaining the military balance of forces~ in the Middle East which was followed by Great Britain and France and later adopted by the United States meant, for the colonial states who supported the Zionist entity, the necessity to strengthen this entity militarily, to make it stronger than all the neighboring Arab countries and any others that might take part in a war against it. If we are told that in the conflict with the enemy, the military situation at this moment is not in our favor (an opinion that we do not accept), we will not deny this, but state that the enemy has had such an advantage for a long time. We know this and have said it before; there is therefore no new element in the situation that forces us to change our position.
Concerning the third question:
We will not discuss -the situation and the capabilities of the Arab regions bordering on the Zionist enemy for fear of making judgement that will provoke disagreement: we will only remark that officials in Egypt and Syria categorically affirm that the political, economic, military and social situations in their countries are better than they have ever been.
As concerns the situation in the Arab countries in general and in the countries that supported the belligerents in the last war, we would like to make the following points:
A - In 1956, Egypt fought alone against Israel, Great Britain and France; no other country actually participated in the war. In 1967, Egypt, Syria and Jordan fought together, but without any real aid from any other country. In 1973, the Iraqi army fought in the war alongside Egypt, and Syrian and Algerian, Moroccan and Libyan troops. Saudi and Jordanian contingents also arrived at the front. (We shall not discuss the importance and the aim of their consignment). Finally, after the cease-fire, Kuwait sent military units.
Therefore, on the military level —in other words as regards the cooperation of Arab forces with the countries bordering on the Zionist entity— the attitude of the Arabs is more satisfactory than ever.
B - On the political and economic levels, Algeria, which was a French colony until the beginning of the sixties, when France went to war with Egypt in an attempt to crush the Algerian revolution, has become an independent state which used its political, military and economic capacities in support of Egypt and Syria in the last war. Libya was a state, which played no effective role in the Arab world and served mostly as a British and American military base. Today, it is an independent state with no more foreign military bases, and it also supported Egypt and Syria in 1973. The Gulf countries, which had been British protectorates to this point and had never given any aid to the countries at war with the Zionist entity, sent Egypt and Syria financial aid both before and, during the last war. Saudi Arabia did the same thing although we have a special conception of the role that this country played throughout the war. However, this is not the object of our analysis, for we want to present only information that will not provoke debate, especially among the governments in question.
In conclusion, we can state that the economic and political support given to Syria and Egypt by the Arabs is evidence of a more favorable stand than ever before.
C - The third point concerns the role of petroleum. We do have a particular and carefully defined conception of the way to use petroleum as a weapon and a special judgement of the measures taken in this regard during the last war. However, we will restrict our remarks to grounds that are undisputed by official Arab circles. These circles insist that the use and the manner of using petroleum during the last war worked in favor of the Arabs. We will cede them this point and say that this is another advantage for the Arab cause.
- We may conclude that the situation of the Arabs and their attitude towards the countries at war with the Zionists (leaving aside our viewpoint and particular interpretation) are now, according to all official Arab circles, more satisfactory than ever! If this is the case, why have these governments modified their attitude and announced their intention to recognize the Zionist entity?