Settlement of the Kurdish Problem in Iraq
KDP's PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT
Part 1
While affirming that participation in political power by any nationality must come through the true political representatives of that nationality (in order to provide that participation with its full national, democratic and social essence), there still remains a difference between the participation of the members of a given nationality in the government of the country where they live and the participation of this or that political party which belongs to that given nationality.
If the concerned state stipulates in its constitution and laws the right of a given nationality to participate in political power, this right becomes "universal". But, the definition of the individuals and political forces eligible to represent that nationality in power, together with the specification of the size of representation of each of them, is a matter that is governed by the nature of the political, economic and social system prevailing in the state, by the size of each of the involved political forces and by other questions determined by the domestic conditions of every state.
As we have repeatedly stated, the ABSP that leads political power in Iraq, absolutely believes in the full and fair participation of the Kurdish nationality in the government of the country. Such participation was guaranteed in the Interim Constitution, in the March Manifesto and in the established laws. Moreover it was incarnated by deeds ever since the March Manifesto.
One of the main problems in this issue is that the KDP mixes its own right for participation together with the size of its participation with those of the entire Kurdish population. The KDP also refuses to draw a dividing line between the natures of the two participations.
This should not imply an intention to overlook the KDP's right for participation in power. The KDP, on the one hand, is a main political force inside the Kurdish nationality. On the other hand, the regime set up by the July 17 Revolution rests on the participation in power by the entire nationalist, national and progressive political parties and forces. But while the recognition of the right of the Kurdish nationality to participate in political power is absolute and unconditional, the participation of the KDP can neither be absolute nor unconditional.
The KDP's participation in the government of the country must come within the framework of the general criteria and commands necessitated by the nature of the regime existing in Iraq. Brothers in the KDP might argue that they do not recognize the criteria and controls specified in this connection by the ABSP. We do not deny them this right. But, while respecting it, we must not override the axiomatic general and basic criteria and commands that are no longer contested by the nationalist, national and progressive parties and forces in Iraq, which, by virtue of their political and social identity, can also be partners in the political authority.
Nor have the ABSP's efforts ended there. By formulating the draft National Action Charter, the ABSP sought to present a '"common factor", so to speak, of the programmes of the political parties and forces that can join the authority of the national alliance. Through dialogue and scrutiny, the ABSP works presently for reaching a common formula for the Charter that can be endorsed by all political parties and forces eligible to take part in government.
On this basis, the participation in power by the KDP, as a political party, will be determined in future in the light of the fundamental starting points of the March Manifesto and the principles embodied in the National Action Charter.
To cast light on the nature, attitudes and demands of the KDP, it is very necessary to study some aspects of the experience of the participation in government by this Party since the March Manifesto. This is equally very necessary for learning lessons from the mistakes of past experience in charting out a more correct road.
A. Participation or Confrontation?
The March Manifesto is devoted to settling the question of the national rights of the Kurdish people. It included no political, economic and social general programme that might provide common guiding lines for action by both the ABSP and the KDP in all political, economic and social spheres within a given period.
Consequently, pending agreement on a common programme of action, the KDP, which joined the government after the March Manifesto, has the right to express its own opinions and positions, through its own media, in all political economic and social issues. But exercising this right does not mean, automatically, playing the role of the "opposition" all through.
The sheer participation in any political authority presupposes a concern for maintaining a reasonable degree of conformity and accord. Otherwise, participation will not have any positive and constructive meaning. In fact, lack of cooperation will lead to exposing the authority to grave tremors hindering the performance of its basic domestic and national responsibilities.
In point of fact, the KDP understood the question of participation in government in the strangest concept.
On the one hand, it takes participation as a "right", from the angle of "being the representative of the Kurdish nationality"; on the other hand it takes opposing the government as a "right" emanating from its being "a political party with its own views on political, economic and social affairs."
The KDP's participation in political power, viewed from the angle of its being a Kurdish party, is a legitimate right but practicing this right means, at the same time, a degree of commitments to the government and to the political system in which the KDP takes part. Otherwise, its "participation" nullifies its natural essence and becomes ”dictation".
From a political angle, it is not at all possible to alienate the question of the Kurdish people's exercising their legitimate rights, including participation in power, from the nature of the regime that secured those rights.
This reality presupposes that the true representatives of the aspirations of the Kurdish people should be concerned for the safety of the regime that guaranteed those ambitions and should defend it in the face of the conspiratorial attempts directed against it by imperialists and reaction who have in the past, and are still, taking up ferociously hostile positions against the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Kurdish people.
One need not cite examples to prove that the KDP has not, from the date of its participation in government up till now, shown any form of commitment to the political authority and the revolutionary regime prevailing in Iraq. Worse than this leading elements in the KDP acted and still acts in collusion with internal and external, imperialist, reactionary and suspect forces to spin plots against the revolutionary regime.
Throughout this period, the internal and external institutions and organizations of the KDP missed no chance to scandalize the ABSP and the revolutionary power –using all ways and means, and during all "positive" and "negative" circumstances.
This fantastic and unique phenomenon-the dual state of opponent-partner -has become a mounting danger to the country's security and basic interests as well as to its march towards the attainment of the people's liberating, progressive and democratic aims and aspirations.
Whatever might be the extent of devotion to self-control to awaiting the natural development of conditions and to the struggle for building democratic institutions, that phenomenon cannot be tolerated forever, whatever its justification might be. Iraq is a country that inherited scores of complicated political, economic and social problems created throughout black centuries of enslavement and backwardness and by reactionary and dictatorial regimes. Further, Iraq lies in one of the most explosive and dangerous areas of the world.
These impending dangers include: the Zionist enemy's threat, with full and violent imperialist backing, to usurp the whole area and to enslave its entire population; the perpetual menace by the rulers of Iran to the sovereignty of Iraq and to the Arab Gulf area, which is nationally linked with Iraq, and which is strategic for the security and vital interests of Iraq; the fierce battle raging between the Iraqi people and Revolution on the one hand and the oil monopolies and imperialist states on the other (No two patriots can possibly quarrel over the fact that the oil battle is our most dangerous and complicated patriotic fight and over the need to mobilize all nationalist efforts and capabilities required for securing ultimate victory) ; the scores of basic tasks confronting the Revolution in fields of consolidating political and economic independence, assuring the basic interest of the masses of the people and attaining the legitimate rights of all Iraqi citizens-including, of course, the national rights of the Kurdish nationality.
Under such conditions and circumstances, is it permissible to shut one's eyes to that phenomenon and to "disassociate" the question of the KDP's participation in power from the dangerous circumstances and practices surrounding it and to portray the matter as a "legitimate demand", which the revolutionary authority does not want to meet?
B. Relations with Ruling Iranian Reaction:
The close relations, existing for years and in all spheres, between the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement on one side and the ruling reactionary regime in
Iran on the other side are one of the most dangerous problems that have been arousing serious anxiety amongst nationalist quarters in Iraq.
They constitute a very serious obstacle that impedes the creation of any rear cooperation or alliance between the KDP on one hand and the ABSP and the rest of the nationalist political parties and forces on the other. In no way can this dangerous relationship be ignored when discussing the KDP's participation in power, and, indeed, when examining its role in the life of the entire country.
The severance of these relations was upper most of the conditions presented by the revolutionary authority and the ABSP to the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement during the talks that preceded the March Manifesto. The leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement undertook to end these relations, justifying their past existence by the economic siege imposed on the areas controlled by the Kurdish Movement during the years of fighting.
Although we were not convinced by that justification, we sincerely anticipated the severance or the gradual curtailment of these relations immediately after the declaration of the March Manifesto and the beginning of the practical implementation of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question.
But events and evidence came one after the other to prove that, far from being severed or curtailed, those relations continued to be consolidated and expanded. Our arguments, demands and appeals have all gone with the wind, despite the fact that this case, and its everyday ramifications, has been the principal point in the agenda of every meeting held between the ABSP and the KDP, and despite their being our basic condition in respect to the commitments we held the KDP must undertake.
Now, more than two and a half years since the declaration of the March Manifesto now, after the revolutionary authority has covered a long distance on the path of implementing the clauses and provisions of the Manifesto we find ourselves facing the following realities:
1. The flow, in substantial quantities, of Iranian arms into the northern area, especially during the intensified strife between the Iraqi Revolution and the reactionary Iranian government. It was obvious that this flow was accelerated, and concentrated, following the historic Nationalization (of the Iraqi Petroleum Company. ”IPC") Act of 1st June, 972.
2. The delivery by foreign sources, via Iran, to the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement of heavy and light weapons together with a new broadcasting station.
3. The military training in Iran of a great many members of the Peshmerga, especially in heavy weapons.
4. The dispatch of some Kurdish students, from the members of the KDP, to join the Iranian military colleges and institutes.
5 Communication of military information, concerning the Iraqi army, was passed by certain elements of the KDP to the Iranian authorities for onward transmission to an “Israeli” liaison officer. These elements hold prominent positions in the KDP, and they are well known to the KDP's leadership.
6 The siding of armed members of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement with the Iranian armed forces in certain frontier clashes. Indeed, this collaboration reached the extent of some Kurdish "frontier guards" and armed members of the KDP enabling armed Iranian forces occupy part of Iraqi territory in the Khanaqin area.
7 The reception, sheltering and guiding inside Iraqi land (by a number of KDP's members, quite known to the party's leadership) of some Iranian intelligence agents who committed acts of espionage and sabotage inside Iraqi territory.
8 The flooding of the northern area by Iranian and Israeli commodities. This resulted in a very strong Iranian economic influence in the region and reached the extent where the public sale of Iranian goods has become an ordinary affair in markets in the areas controlled by the KDP.
9 The circulation of counterfeits Iraqi currency printed by Iranian intelligence with the intention of destroying the Iraqi economy.
10 The transfer of patients, particularly party officials to Iran for medical treatment in hospitals there.
11 The facilitation of the exit of a number of persons, via Iran, in contravention of the government's orders banning traveling abroad in accordance with the austerity measures taken after the nationalization of IPC.
12 The aggravation of the influence of the Iranian intelligence, in the areas controlled by the KDP and the Kurdish Movement, to the degree that enabled it to kidnap and kill ordinary citizens and members of the armed forces.
13 The admission of foreigners to the northern area, via Iran.
14 The handing over to Irani authorities of Iranian patriots, including members of the Iranian KDPI who escaped from the Iranian reactionary rule.
Other Iranian patriots were also either imprisoned or killed by elements of the KDP.
15 The exchange of visits between leading elements of the KDP and Iranian officials.
16 The smuggling of certain Iraqi Jews to Iran, in preparation to their onward escape to "Israel".
Wrong Manifestations
The above are some aspects of the menacing relations prevailing between the KDP and the Kurdish Movement on one side and the Iranian reactionary rule on the other. They keep confronting us every day during the persevering and devoted work for laying the foundation of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question.
In discussing these relations, perhaps it is useful to mention the following two points:
1 An analysis of the political and theoretical documents of the KDP does not reveal any "ideological" agreement between the KDP's doctrine and that of the ruling Iranian reactionary class.
2 The ruling reaction in Iran does not belong to the Kurdish nationality. It rather denies the great many Kurds (much more than Iraqi Kurds) the simplest national and political fundamentals and savagely and ruthlessly persecutes them.
Since there is no "ideological" or: "national" relationship between the two parties, why, then, should there be such a broad and serious relation between them? We will not reply to this question, leaving the answer to brothers in the KDP -members and cadres -because we failed to hear any reasonable or acceptable justification from their leadership. They are responsible, before the Kurdish people in particular and the Iraqi people in general, to answer the question.
To be continued