PALESTINE A MODERN HISTORY
Abdul Wahab Said Al Kayyali
Chapter
5
Part 3 end
The Lull: 1923-1929
No Arab Atrocities
On top of Chancellor's general accusations there were Zionist allegations of Arab atrocities at Hebron on 24 August. When the Arabs denied that any acts of mutilations had taken place, a formal request by the Palestine Zionist Executive was made to the High Commissioner to authorise the exhumation of bodies of Jews who had been killed at
Hebron. (57) Thereupon, Chancellor instructed the Director of Health to appoint a special committee, composed of British doctors, to examine the exhumed bodies with a view to ascertaining whether they had been mutilated or not, in the presence of Jewish and Arab representatives.
The special committee submitted a report on 13 September in which it stated that the charges of 'mutilation' were not substantiated in the cases of the twenty bodies, which were exhumed, four of which were referred to them by the Jewish representatives. (58) The report of the medical committee was looked upon as a political and moral victory for the Palestinian Arabs who, in their turn, had insisted that the exhumation should be carried out.
In their turn the Arabs complained that the Attorney-General Norman Bentwich was pro-Zionist and demanded his dismissal. (59)
There were other complaints as well: 'the severity of the Police which had reached a limit that they thought was unheard of in a civilised country', in addition to the rigorous suppression of the Arabic papers 'for trivial reasons'. (60)
The High Commissioner was anxious that the Executive should use their influence to prevent incitement by boycott: There was a serious danger at the present time when public opinion was inflamed that some small incident connected with boycotting might develop into a disturbance on a large scale. They must bear in mind that there was a large number of troops in the country now, and any disturbance might lead to bloodshed. (61)
Chancellor's insinuation that any disturbance would soon develop into a clash between the Arabs and British troops was hardly necessary, as the Arab Executive were already advising moderation and were only looking for Government help that would strengthen their hands. (62)
Far from offering the Arab Executive any concessions, Chancellor affirmed the extension of the application of the much-hated Collective Punishment Ordinance over the whole country.
While a growing anti-Government militant mood was making itself felt all over the country, Hajj Amin was assuring Chancellor, in a private interview on 1 October that 'there could be no doubt that the mass of the Arab population were amicably disposed towards Great Britain '. (63) The Mufti's statement implied that he still believed it possible to confine Palestinian opposition to Britain's Zionist policies and to the Zionists themselves and thus avoid a direct clash between Britain and the Arabs. During the latter part of September, Police sources stated that: Shekib Wahab, Syrian revolutionary leader, in conversation with the Grand Mufti, offered to organise bands for a guerrilla campaign to last not less than a year. The Grand Mufti reported to have considered this unnecessary at present. (64)
Hajj Amin sought to impress Chancellor of his loyalty when he told the High Commissioner that he considered himself 'as one who was. in a sense, an officer of the State'. (65) A week later: The Mufti said he promised to help in the maintenance of order and to cooperate with the Government. He had always held this attitude and he held it still and should continue to hold it even if Government did not listen to his representations. He regarded this as his duty not only to the Government but also to God and the people and also to his own conscience. (66)
The Mufti pointed out to the High Commissioner the difficulties involved in his pro-Government position which was particularly unpopular in view of the Government's refusal to abolish the Collective Punishment Ordinance: 'during the last few days he had been charged himself with being in league with the Government in this matter'. On 19 October, Hajj Arnin dispatched Jamal Husseini, Secretary of the Supreme Muslim Council, to London to conduct political discussions at the Colonial Office.
The Government and the Colonial Office proved that they were alive to the importance of maintaining Hajj Arnin's friendly attitude because of his opposition to a direct Arab-British confrontation in Palestine. In deference to the Mufti, the Colonial Secretary eliminated any mention of whether the 1929 outbreak 'may be regarded as having been pre- concerted or due to organised action ' (67) in the final terms of reference
of the Shaw Commission of Enquiry.
By 12 October Chancellor felt compelled to convey to Passfield his alarm at the evolution of Arab political attitudes following the disturbances of 1929: The feeling of the Arabs against the Jews is still bitter. Boycott is being enforced and instigators are working clandestinely and avoiding detection. There is amongst the Arabs a growing feeling of hostility to the Government, which is being fermented by skilful propaganda conducted by Arab leaders. I am informed that this feeling is not as previously confined to political circles, but also now extended to lower classes of the population and to the villagers. (68)
This process of radicalisation posed a threat to the Arab Executive and the traditional leadership: A full meeting of the Arab Executive had been summoned for l2th October to consider the question of calling a general strike as a protest against the Regulations and other alleged acts of partiality and injustice. Younger Moslems declare that the strike will be held whether the Executive approve it or not. (69)
Though successful in calling the strike off, 'Awni' Abdul Hadi told Chancellor in the course of an interview on 14 October, that 'the Executive Committee in their actions are not always their own masters, but have to yield to the pressure of their followers'. (70) The Committee 'were following a policy to do all they could to win over public opinion and to avoid estrangement'. Nevertheless, the Executive Committee assured Chancellor that 'The principle that guided them was that there should be no difference between them and the British Government', (71) as they believed they could not attain their rights otherwise.
Though speaking on behalf of the majority of the notables and the propertied classes, the views expressed by the Executive Committee were not universally embraced by all the members of these classes. According to a Police Report some participants in a meeting of leading Muslim and Christian merchants at the offices of the Arab Executive, spoke openly in favour of revolution: That a general rising is the only means to save the country is common talk among all classes of the population; also that the people have become desperate and unmindful of the risks; further villagers are stated to have become affected by political propaganda and by the economic depression, influence by purchase of lands by Jews and resultant ejection of Arab farmers. (72)
Nor was this militancy presumed to be of a transient character, as Chancellor was of the opinion that it would not be possible to reduce British troops below two battalions even after the crisis was over.
A week later Chancellor reiterated that 'the Moslem population appear to be approaching a state of desperation on account of Government's failure to meet their wishes in any way. This feeling is not confined to the leadership only but has spread to the lower classes and to the rural population'. (73)
Among other factors, the spread of agitation against Zionism and British policy in Palestine to the neighbouring countries, the smuggling of arms to Palestine and the possibility that volunteers from Syria, Transjordan and Lebanon might join the Palestinians in any future uprisings added to the anxieties of British Authorities in Palestine.
During the third week of October police sources reported that money was being collected, and 400 Arabs selected to form an armed force. A week later Police Intelligence reported that 'gangs of Criminals to attack Jews and British officials have been formed and will first function in areas at Haifa. and Nablus. (74) Intelligence summary of the 19th October from Trans-Jordan Frontier Force reported that experienced bandits are being consulted as to the best means of carrying out guerrilla warfare, which may commence after the Commission from London arrives and completes its report. Committees are being formed in many parts of Palestine for the purpose of helping these bands. (75)
The new level of political activism was conducive to the emergence of students (76) as a political element, and to the birth of the Palestine Arab Women 's Congress, which was held on 26 October 1929. The latter was attended by over 200 delegates, both Muslim and Christian from various parts of Palestine. The participants were members of the
leading Palestinian families, the most prominent of whom were wives of Palestinian political leaders. The wife of Musa Kazem was elected to the Chair and many speakers considered the Mandatory Power, as represented by the Palestine Administration, to be solely responsible for all that took place, and a national movement for consolidated action on the part of all women's organizations was earnestly urged. (71)
The resolutions of the Congress rejected the Balfour Declaration and Zionist immigration, called for the establishment of a National Government responsible before a Representative Council, and urged the development of National Industries.
A day later a 'General Assembly of Arab Congress' called by the Arab Executive was held at Jerusalem, Delegates to the Assembly included Beduin Sheikhs from all parts of Palestine and some representatives from Transjordan. According to Police reports, great enthusiasm and determination to 'save the country' even at the cost of their lives was manifested. Judging from the attitude of the Assembly it was apparent that the people were in a state of extreme excitement and approximated to a revolutionary disposition. It is said that the Arabs now await the 'decision' of the commission, and if these are unsatisfactory the only course open to them is a general uprising. (78)
A General strike was called and observed on the Balfour anniversary. The participation of Trans-Jordanians in the Assembly indicated the state of feeling in the adjacent Arab countries. According to a report by the British Resident in' Amman, Transjordan was kept out of the riots in August because. . A plan of action had not been prepared. Should a further outburst against the Jews be arranged, I fear the country might not behave so well. (79)
An intelligence report dated 13 November stated that a secret Committee called the Boycott Committee has been formed for terrorist purposes with a view to the assassination of persons considered to be acting against Arab nationalist interests.
These threats were reported to have led to the drying up of the Arab sources of Police Intelligence. The Committee was reported to have been formed 'with knowledge and consent of Supreme Moslem Council and Arab Executive who have subscribed to expense'. (80) One Arab working for the Zionist Intelligence was assassinated, and a warning was sent to a British Judge. A later report tended to shed some doubt on the links between the Executive Committee and the Boycott Committee as eleven of the twenty-four persons of the latter were reported to be members of the Palestinian Communist Party. (81)
The period between 1923 and 1929 which began with a whimper ended with a bang as Arab opposition to the Anglo-Zionist partnership struck deeper popular roots with a disposition towards waging an armed struggle as a means of forcing a change in British pro-Zionist policies in Palestine. From now onwards the Arab struggle against Zionism involved a direct confrontation between the Palestinian Arabs and the Mandatory Government.
Mention should be made of Zionist attitudes towards the prospect of bringing about an Arab-Jewish understanding in 1929. One month after the August outbreak Weizmann told one of the members of the Middle East Department that The Government should try and get a conference between the Zionists and the Arabs, the latter not necessarily Palestinian Arabs, with the idea of getting both sides to come to a concordat. (82)
A month later H. St. John Philby, one of the major British officials in the East in the early twenties, paid a visit to Jerusalem and Damascus with the intention of drawing up the 'Basis of an Arab-Jewish understanding in Palestine' and found the Arab leaders moderate and reasonable. (83)
When Dr Judah Magnes, head of the Hebrew University, said in a speech at the reopening of the University that it was necessary for Jews and Arabs to find ways of living and working together he was heckled by the students, and the Jewish press attacked both him and the Brith Shalom Organisation. The Administrative Committee of the American Jewish Committee expressed its 'feeling of outrage over Dr. Magnes's utterances and his irresponsibility in breaking the united Jewish front. (84)
57. See Chancellor to Passfield, 21 September 1929, CO 733/175, p.3.
58. See ibid., Enclosure IV to XII. 59. See Memorandum by the Executive Committee to the H.Cr.l October 1929, CO 733/175.
60. Chancellor to Passfield, 5 October 1929,CO 733/175.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid. Two weeks later the Executive requested that Jewish immigration be suspended until the Commission of Enquiry had submitted their recommendations. See 'Meeting of interview of the Arab Executive with the High Commissioner', 17 October 1929, CO 733/163, p.10.
63. Ibid., Enclosure II, p.l.
64. Cabinet, 'Situation in Palestine', 28 November 1929,CO 733/17 p.4.
65. Ibid., p.3.
66. Chancellor to Passfield, 12 October 1929, CO 733/163, Enclosure 11, p.3.
67. Passfield to Shaw, 19 September 1929, CO 733/176
68. H.Cr. to Colonial Secretary ,12 October 1929, CO 733/175.
69. Ibid.
70. Chancellor to Passfield, 19 October 1929, CO 733/163, Enclosure I, p.4.
71.lbid.,p.5.
72. 'Situation in Palestine', 28 November 1929, op.cit.
73. H.Cr. to Colonial Secretary, 19 October, CO 733/163.
74. Ibid., p.5.
75. ibid., p.6.
76. Same to Same, 23 October 1929, CO 733/163.
77. Mogannam, The Arab Woman, op.cit., p.70.
78. 'Situation in Palestine', 28 November 1929, op.cit., p.6.
79. Ibid.
80.lbid.,p.7.
81. Ibid., p.8.
82. Departmental Note, 23 September 1929, CO 733/175, p.2.
83. See Letters from Philby to Passfield, 1 November 1929, CO 733/175.
84. See Extract from The Jewish Guardian, 29 November 1929, CO 733/175, p.1.