The president's real goal in Iraq
By JAY BOOKMAN
(Bookman is the deputy
editorial page editor of The Atlanta Journal-Constitution)
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The official story on Iraq
has never made sense. The connection that the Bush administration has tried to
draw between Iraq and al-Qaida has always seemed contrived and artificial. In
fact, it was hard to believe that smart people in the Bush administration would
start a major war based on such flimsy evidence.
The pieces just didn't
fit. Something else had to be going on; something was missing.
In recent days, those
missing pieces have finally begun to fall into place. As it turns out, this is
not really about Iraq. It is not about weapons of mass destruction, or
terrorism, or Saddam, or U.N. resolutions.
This war, should
it come, is intended to mark the official emergence of the United States as a
full-fledged global empire, seizing sole responsibility and authority as
planetary policeman. It would be the culmination of a plan 10 years or more in
the making, carried out by those who believe the United States must seize the
opportunity for global domination, even if it means becoming the "American
imperialists" that our enemies always claimed we were.
Once that is
understood, other mysteries solve themselves. For example, why does the
administration seem unconcerned about an exit strategy from Iraq once Saddam is
toppled?
Because we won't be
leaving. Having conquered Iraq, the United States will create permanent military
bases in that country from which to dominate the Middle East, including
neighboring Iran.
In an interview Friday,
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld brushed aside that suggestion, noting that the
United States does not covet other nations' territory. That may be true, but 57
years after World War II ended, we still have major bases in Germany and Japan.
We will do the same in Iraq.
And why has the
administration dismissed the option of containing and deterring Iraq, as we had
the Soviet Union for 45 years? Because even if it worked, containment and
deterrence would not allow the expansion of American power. Besides, they are
beneath us as an empire. Rome did not stoop to containment; it conquered. And so
should we.
Among the architects of
this would-be American Empire are a group of brilliant and powerful people who
now hold key positions in the Bush administration: They envision the creation
and enforcement of what they call a worldwide "Pax Americana," or
American peace. But so far, the American people have not appreciated the true
extent of that ambition.
Part of it's laid out
in the National Security Strategy, a document in which each administration
outlines its approach to defending the country. The Bush administration plan,
released Sept. 20, marks a significant departure from previous approaches, a
change that it attributes largely to the attacks of Sept. 11.
To address the
terrorism threat, the president's report lays out a newly aggressive military
and foreign policy, embracing pre-emptive attack against perceived enemies. It
speaks in blunt terms of what it calls "American internationalism," of
ignoring international opinion if that suits U.S. interests. "The best
defense is a good offense," the document asserts.
It dismisses deterrence
as a Cold War relic and instead talks of "convincing or compelling states
to accept their sovereign responsibilities."
In essence, it lays out
a plan for permanent U.S. military and economic domination of every region on
the globe, unfettered by international treaty or concern. And to make that plan
a reality, it envisions a stark expansion of our global military presence.
"The United States
will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast
Asia," the document warns, "as well as temporary access arrangements
for the long-distance deployment of U.S. troops."
The report's repeated
references to terrorism are misleading, however, because the approach of the new
National Security Strategy was clearly not inspired by the events of Sept. 11.
They can be found in much the same language in a report issued in September 2000
by the Project for the New American Century, a group of conservative
interventionists outraged by the thought that the United States might be
forfeiting its chance at a global empire.
"At no time in
history has the international security order been as conducive to American
interests and ideals," the report said. stated two years ago. "The
challenge of this coming century is to preserve and enhance this 'American
peace.' "
Familiar themes
Overall, that 2000
report reads like a blueprint for current Bush defense policy. Most of what it
advocates, the Bush administration has tried to accomplish. For example, the
project report urged the repudiation of the anti-ballistic missile treaty and a
commitment to a global missile defense system. The administration has taken that
course.
It recommended that to
project sufficient power worldwide to enforce Pax Americana, the United States
would have to increase defense spending from 3 percent of gross domestic product
to as much as 3.8 percent. For next year, the Bush administration has requested
a defense budget of $379 billion, almost exactly 3.8 percent of GDP.
It advocates the
"transformation" of the U.S. military to meet its expanded
obligations, including the cancellation of such outmoded defense programs as the
Crusader artillery system. That's exactly the message being preached by Rumsfeld
and others.
It urges the
development of small nuclear warheads "required in targeting the very deep,
underground hardened bunkers that are being built by many of our potential
adversaries." This year the GOP-led U.S. House gave the Pentagon the green
light to develop such a weapon, called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator,
while the Senate has so far balked.
That close tracking of
recommendation with current policy is hardly surprising, given the current
positions of the people who contributed to the 2000 report.
Paul Wolfowitz is now
deputy defense secretary. John Bolton is undersecretary of state. Stephen
Cambone is head of the Pentagon's Office of Program, Analysis and Evaluation.
Eliot Cohen and Devon Cross are members of the Defense Policy Board, which
advises Rumsfeld. I. Lewis Libby is chief of staff to Vice President Dick
Cheney. Dov Zakheim is comptroller for the Defense Department.
'Constabulary
duties'
Because they were still
just private citizens in 2000, the authors of the project
report could be more frank and less diplomatic than they were in drafting
the National Security Strategy. Back in 2000, they clearly identified Iran, Iraq
and North Korea as primary short-term targets, well before President Bush tagged
them as the Axis of Evil. In their report, they criticize the fact that in war
planning against North Korea and Iraq, "past Pentagon wargames have given
little or no consideration to the force requirements necessary not only to
defeat an attack but to remove these regimes from power."
To preserve the Pax
Americana, the report says U.S. forces will be required to perform
"constabulary duties" -- the United States acting as policeman of the
world -- and says that such actions "demand American political leadership
rather than that of the United Nations."
To meet those
responsibilities, and to ensure that no country dares to challenge the United
States, the report advocates a much larger military presence spread over more of
the globe, in addition to the roughly 130 nations in which U.S. troops are
already deployed.
More specifically, they
argue that we need permanent military bases in the Middle East, in Southeast
Europe, in Latin America and in Southeast Asia, where no such bases now exist.
That helps to explain another of the mysteries of our post-Sept. 11 reaction, in
which the Bush administration rushed to install U.S. troops in Georgia and the
Philippines, as well as our eagerness to send military advisers to assist in the
civil war in Colombia.
The 2000 report
directly acknowledges its debt to a still earlier document, drafted in 1992 by
the Defense Department. That document had also envisioned the United States as a
colossus astride the world, imposing its will and keeping world peace through
military and economic power. When leaked in final draft form, however, the
proposal drew so much criticism that it was hastily withdrawn and repudiated by
the first President Bush.
Effect on allies
The defense secretary
in 1992 was Richard Cheney; the document was drafted by Wolfowitz, who at the
time was defense undersecretary for policy.
The potential
implications of a Pax Americana are immense.
One is the effect on
our allies. Once we assert the unilateral right to act as the world's policeman,
our allies will quickly recede into the background. Eventually, we will be
forced to spend American wealth and American blood protecting the peace while
other nations redirect their wealth to such things as health care for their
citizenry.
Donald Kagan, a
professor of classical Greek history at Yale and an influential advocate of a
more aggressive foreign policy -- he served as co-chairman of the 2000 New
Century project -- acknowledges that likelihood.
"If [our allies]
want a free ride, and they probably will, we can't stop that," he says. But
he also argues that the United States, given its unique position, has no choice
but to act anyway.
"You saw the movie
'High Noon'? he asks. "We're Gary Cooper."
Accepting the Cooper
role would be an historic change in who we are as a nation, and in how we
operate in the international arena. Candidate Bush certainly did not campaign on
such a change. It is not something that he or others have dared to discuss
honestly with the American people. To the contrary, in his foreign policy debate
with Al Gore, Bush pointedly advocated a more humble foreign policy, a position
calculated to appeal to voters leery of military intervention.
For the same reason,
Kagan and others shy away from terms such as empire, understanding its
connotations. But they also argue that it would be naive and dangerous to reject
the role that history has thrust upon us. Kagan, for example, willingly embraces
the idea that the United States would establish permanent military bases in a
post-war Iraq.
"I think that's
highly possible," he says. "We will probably need a major
concentration of forces in the Middle East over a long period of time. That will
come at a price, but think of the price of not having it. When we have economic
problems, it's been caused by disruptions in our oil supply. If we have a force
in Iraq, there will be no disruption in oil supplies."
Costly global
commitment
Rumsfeld and Kagan
believe that a successful war against Iraq will produce other benefits, such as
serving an object lesson for nations such as Iran and Syria. Rumsfeld, as befits
his sensitive position, puts it rather gently. If a regime change were to take
place in Iraq, other nations pursuing weapons of mass destruction "would
get the message that having them . . . is attracting attention that is not
favorable and is not helpful," he says.
Kagan is more blunt.
"People worry a
lot about how the Arab street is going to react," he notes. "Well, I
see that the Arab street has gotten very, very quiet since we started blowing
things up."
The cost of such a
global commitment would be enormous. In 2000, we spent $281 billion on our
military, which was more than the next 11 nations combined. By 2003, our
expenditures will have risen to $378 billion. In other words, the increase
in our defense budget from 1999-2003 will be more than the total amount spent
annually by China, our next largest competitor.
The lure of empire is
ancient and powerful, and over the millennia it has driven men to commit
terrible crimes on its behalf. But with the end of the Cold War and the
disappearance of the Soviet Union, a global empire was essentially laid at the
feet of the United States. To the chagrin of some, we did not seize it at the
time, in large part because the American people have never been comfortable with
themselves as a New Rome.
Now, more than a decade
later, the events of Sept. 11 have given those advocates of empire a new
opportunity to press their case with a new president. So in debating whether to
invade Iraq, we are really debating the role that the United States will play in
the years and decades to come.
Are peace and security
best achieved by seeking strong alliances and international consensus, led by
the United States? Or is it necessary to take a more unilateral approach,
accepting and enhancing the global dominance that, according to some, history
has thrust upon us?
If we do decide to
seize empire, we should make that decision knowingly, as a democracy. The price
of maintaining an empire is always high. Kagan and others argue that the price
of rejecting it would be higher still.
That's what this is
about.
"Rebuilding
America's Defenses,"
a 2000 report by the Project for the New American Century, listed 27 people as
having attended meetings or contributed papers in preparation of the report.
Among them are six who have since assumed key defense and foreign policy
positions in the Bush administration. And the report seems to have become a
blueprint for Bush's foreign and defense policy.
Paul Wolfowitz
Political science doctorate from University of Chicago and dean of the
international relations program at Johns Hopkins University during the 1990s.
Served in the Reagan State Department, moved to the Pentagon during the first
Bush administration as undersecretary of defense for policy. Sworn in as deputy
defense secretary in March 2001.
John Bolton
Yale Law grad who worked in the Reagan administration as an assistant attorney
general. Switched to the State Department in the first Bush administration as
assistant secretary for international organization affairs. Sworn in as
undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, May 2001.
Eliot Cohen
Harvard doctorate in government who taught at Harvard and at the Naval War
College. Now directs strategic studies at Johns Hopkins and is the author of
several books on military strategy. Was on the Defense Department's policy
planning staff in the first Bush administration and is now on Donald Rumsfeld's
Defense Policy Board.
I. Lewis Libby
Law degree from Columbia (Yale undergrad). Held advisory positions in the Reagan
State Department. Was a partner in a Washington law firm in the late '80s before
becoming deputy undersecretary of defense for policy in the first Bush
administration (under Dick Cheney). Now is the vice president's chief of staff.
Dov Zakheim
Doctorate in economics and politics from Oxford University. Worked on policy
issues in the Reagan Defense Department and went into private defense consulting
during the 1990s. Was foreign policy adviser to the 2000 Bush campaign. Sworn in
as undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the
Pentagon, May 2001.
Stephen Cambone
Political science doctorate from Claremont Graduate School. Was in charge of
strategic defense policy at the Defense Department in the first Bush
administration. Now heads the Office of Program, Analysis and Evaluation at the
Defense Department.
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