PALESTINE A MODERN HISTORY
Abdul Wahab Said Al
Kayyali
DEADLOCK: 1920-1923
Chapter 4
Part 4
At this stage Samuel
adopted a new attitude toward the Palestinian opposition, when he advocated
encouraging the emergence of the Moderate Party. In a comprehensive survey of
the political and economic conditions in Palestine, Samuel urged the Duke of
Devonshire, the new Colonial Secretary, to maintain his predecessor's
Palestine policy as a means of bringing about political stability, in addition
to strengthening the hands of the pro-Government elements among Arab ranks.
(129)
When Devonshire
received the Palestinian Delegation in January 1923, he informed them that the
new Conservative Government did not propose to repudiate the Balfour Declaration
or to change the policy enunciated in Churchill 's White Paper.
Back in Palestine the
Arab National Movement energetically campaigned in favour of the boycott of the
Legislative Council elections. At the instigation of the preachers, Palestinians
swore an oath in their places of devotion to boycott the elections, (130) and
numerous meetings harped on the theme that accepting a Constitution based on the
Balfour Declaration was tantamount to national suicide.
Besides boycotting
the Legislative Council the Palestinian national movement was engaged in an
effort for economic self-betterment and for the protection of the Arab
agriculturalists. On I February 1923, the Arab Economic Agricultural Conference
held its first meeting. An Executive Committee was elected and attached to the
Executive Committee of the Arab Congress with which it was charged to cooperate
in economic and political matters. It was resolved to demand the abolition of
certain agricultural taxes and dues, to encourage the plantation of tobacco and
trees, and to request the Government to institute an agricultural school.
However, the most important resolution was " To demand from the Government
the enactment of a law forbidding the Fallah to sell his land if it is less than
200 dunoms in order that it provides means of livelihood on the lines of the
Egyptian Law of the 5 feddans."
As the boycott
campaign gathered momentum both Samuel and the pro-Government forces found
themselves in a tight spot. The pro Government party sought to extract certain
concessions as a means of justifying its inclination to work with the
Government. Samuel favoured the granting of some concessions to the Moderates as
a means of strengthening their hand and mitigating public opinion in Palestine.
On 11 February, Samuel reported to Devonshire that he had received an overture
on behalf of important sections of Arabs who would be prepared to abandon
opposition to the Balfour Declaration and come forward to cooperate with the
Government at elections on certain conditions:
(One) annual
immigration to be limited numerically.
(Two) Election to
Legislative Council of Arab members by High Commissioner from lists submitted by
local bodies in such number as to constitute a majority with elected members.
(Three)
British officials to retain the substance of executive authority but
number of Palestinians in important positions in the Administration to be
largely increased.
(Four) An Arab Emir
to be appointed in Palestine the High Commissioner remaining with present
functions. (131)
While Samuel found
that last condition objectionable and had other reservations to make he proposed
to carry on with the conversations awaiting a positive decision by the Colonial
Secretary.
Devonshire's reply
was discouraging and nothing could be done to save the patriotic pretences of
the pro-Government Party. The boycott of the elections by the overwhelming
majority of the Palestinians provided a clear victory for the Arab Executive
Committee over the Government's policies and the pro-Government elements who
dared nominate themselves. It bolstered the Committee's position in the country
.On 12 March 1923 it issued a proclamation advising stoppage of work and closing
of shops on 14 March in honour of the attitude adopted by the 'Arab Nation' at
the elections. (132) It was also decided to extend a popular welcome for the
returning Arab Delegation. During the processions the police came in contact
with the crowds when attempting to arrest a number of marchers who were shouting
provocative slogans.
Many were wounded,
others were arrested, and the incident was looked upon as an example of police
brutality. Protests were received from all parts of Palestine, and the incident
gave rise to a fresh wave of ill feeling against the Government.
The approaching Nebi
Musa celebrations provided an opportunity for the Executive Committee to force
the hand of the Government by a display of militancy. Instead they devised
'general arrangements for the control of the crowds and of the processions'.
Earlier on Jamal Husseini, Secretary of the Executive Committee, was reported to
have told Deedes, in a private interview, that there were two alternative
methods for the attainment of full political rights in Palestine: either by
constitutional means or by revolution; that the first was to be preferred though
the second would give them what they justly claimed in six months. (133)
In the following month Jamal Husseini had an interview with a member of the Administration during which he reported that pressure from many quarters was being exerted with the object of convening the Arab Congress and of defining and laying down the attitude to be adopted by the country at large towards the Government. Furthermore.
A strong body of
"opinion was in favour of non-payment of taxes as the next step to be taken
without making any more appeals to England and the British Government. He
himself, he said, was not in favour of plunging into a non-payment policy. He
preferred to make another appeal to England. (l34)
Following the
successful Arab boycott of the elections Samuel announced the suspension of the
Legislative Council clauses of the Constitution and proposed to establish new
Advisory Council. (135) The Executive Committee took strong exception to the new
measure and maintained that nothing but more chaos without the least benefit
could result from it.
During the month of May, pressure by the Executive Committee was exerted on the nominees for the Advisory Council to refuse to serve. The Arab members were faced with popular agitation and after hesitation had to resign before Samuel's set date for the Council's first sitting.
A telegram from King
Hussein to the Arab Executive Committee dated 17 May caused the circulation of
rumours that the Balfour Declaration had been revoked. The telegram was
paraphrased and published by the Arab Executive Committee accompanied by advice
to the people to avoid anything that might disturb peace and tranquility in
Palestine. A week later the Arab Executive Committee resolved to postpone
convening the Sixth Arab Palestine Congress until after the publication of
Hussein's treaty with Britain, better known as the Anglo-Hijaz Treaty.
The Sixth Palestine Arab Congress was held in Jaffa between 16 and 20 June 1923, under the chairmanship of Musa Kazem. The Anglo-Arab Treaty, one of the major topics of the Congress, was rejected and declared to be contrary to the rights and interests of the Arabs of Palestine. Furthermore, it was resolved that a new Arab Delegation, again headed by Musa Kazem, proceed to London immediately and contact members of Parliament and the Colonial Office before the new Treaty was definitely signed.
The other major issue that preoccupied the Congress was the question of non-payment of taxes to the Government. The discussion on this vital issue, which preoccupied public opinion before the Congress was convened, was opened by Jamal Husseini, who argued in a lengthy and well reasoned speech for the adoption of a policy of non-payment of taxes. The Government he said obtained taxes and distributed them to Zionist Societies and Jewish immigrants. Owing to Zionist pressure the Government refrained from extending agricultural loans to the Arabs thereby causing the economic death of the fellah. The High Commissioner was granting lands and concessions to the Jews without consulting the Arabs. He concluded by specifying that the Economic Committee should consider the non-payment of taxes on the basis of the principle 'No taxation without representation'.
In the Economic Committee' sharp differences of opinion arose, and it was decided to refer the matter to the Executive Committee who 'should study the question of refusing to pay taxes to the Government and put it into force when the occasion arises'. (l36) Opposition to this resolution was expressed in the general meeting on the basis that it was impossible to implement this measure without causing an evolution and in a country as small and poor as Palestine it was futile to hope that a revolution against the British Government would succeed. (137)
No definite decision was reached on this cardinal issue. However, certain conclusions may be drawn from the respective backgrounds of the supporters and the opponents of the motion for non-payment. Jamal Husseini was mainly supported by 'Isa al'Isa and 'Isa Bandak, both educated middle-class Christian journalists, while his opposite number was mainly supported by Amin Bey Tamimi and Hafez Bey Tuqan, both of whom were rich effendis, the latter on friendly terms with the Zionists.
An authoritative explanation of the motives of those who opposed the idea of non-payment of taxes was provided by the Governor of Samaria: Before the meeting Congress) was held I had the Mayor's assurance that resolutions to refuse to pay taxes would not be adopted. He told me that Hajj Said Shawa was very anxious that the resolution to refuse to pay taxes should not be adopted because he was a large
landowner and would be the first to suffer from whatever action the Government would take. (138)
It should be further noted that the political leadership failed to use the powerful weapon of non-payment of taxes at a time when such a measure stood a good chance of being adhered to by large sections of the population. According to the Administration's reports Jamal Husseini's speech advocating non-payment of taxes 'has given satisfaction to the Arab population '. (139) In Northern Palestine an attack on British gendarmes took place on 10 June. In the Southern District the inhabitants were discontented.: Their state of mind is such that anti-Government propaganda and in particular non-payment of tithes and taxes propaganda would be sympathetically received. (140)
After electing a new Executive Committee the Congress adopted twenty-four resolutions, and charged the new Executive with carrying out the boycott of the Rutenberg Scheme and of Jewish goods and activities in general. Money was collected for the departing Delegation and for the London pro-Arab British Bureau.
Stimulated by news from England that a Cabinet Committee was sitting to report on the Palestine question the new Arab Delegation left Palestine on 15 July. The Cabinet Committee, however, refused to grant an interview to the Delegation, which 'caused disgust and disappointment in Arab nationalist circles', (141) Instead of recalling the Delegation and convening a Congress to study the attitude of the British Government and draw the logical conclusions as to the line of action the Arabs should adopt, the Executive Committee resolved to instruct the Delegation to remain in England and visit America for propaganda and fund-raising purposes.
An explanation of the attitude was provided by Gilbert Clayton, an experienced old hand in Arab and Palestinian affairs, who replaced Deedes as Civil Secretary in the spring of 1923. In a letter to Devonshire, Clayton reported the gist of a conversation he had with 'some of the more advanced members of the Moslem Christian
Association', who revealed to him the line of action the Association proposed to follow in the event of the return of the Delegation empty-handed. Far from contemplating a revolutionary course of action the Palestinian opposition to the Government intended to stick to constitutional and legal methods. They were particularly encouraged by the growing support for their cause in the House of Commons, and they seem confident enough that their influence over their followers is sufficiently strong to prevent any violent or unconstitutional action as long as they can show that their present policy is giving good results. (142)
Clayton shrewdly recommended to the Colonial Secretary not to dash these hopes to the ground too suddenly, and that the Arabs ...should have some grounds for maintaining their present policy which at least has the merit of causing them to refrain from other and more undesirable methods, thus giving time for wise counsels to prevail.
Soon afterwards Clayton 's hopes for 'wise counsels to prevail ' were taking their speedy course towards realisation: A party which first termed itself the liberal Moderate Party, and subsequently the National Party, is in process of formation. Its avowed policy, although nationalistic, is opposed to that of the Moslem-Christian Association inasmuch as it proposes to attain its ends through cooperation with the Government instead of by opposition. (143)
The hand of the new Party was strengthened following the refusal of the Executive Committee to accept the recommendations of a Cabinet Committee formed during the summer of 1923 to review British policy in Palestine. Although some of the Committee's members thought that the Balfour Declaration was both unnecessary and unwise, the Committee found it impossible for any Government to extricate itself from the Declaration without a substantial sacrifice of consistency and self-respect.
By the time the Palestine Mandate was brought into full operation by the League's Council Resolution of 29 September 1923, the attitude of the three parties of the Palestinian Triangle had already crystallised.
The British Government stood firmly by the Balfour Declaration and the JNH policy, guided by the theory of 'dual obligation " and the principle of the 'economic absorptive capacity' on immigration policy. The final settlement of the Mandate removed all shades of uncertainty and precluded any possibility of drastic change of British policy in Palestine for the foreseeable future.
The Zionists were satisfied that the articles of the Palestine Mandate and British policies in Palestine were conducive to the achievement of their immediate basic aim; namely, the attainment of a Jewish majority, and thus political supremacy, through immigration and land settlement. They were opposed to representative institution and the application of
the principle of self-determination in Palestine on the grounds that the Arab majority would use such institutions to fight Zionism and revoke the Mandate. The Anglo-Zionist convergence was demonstrated by the Zionist acceptance of Churchill's White Paper and embodied in the person of Herbert Samuel himself.
Samuel accurately assessed the Arab position in a perceptive report submitted during January 1924. He said: The large majority of the population of Palestine are Moslem Arabs, and among them, a majority possibly equally large, favour the general views of what may be termed the local opposition to the Palestine policy of His Majesty's Government as applied by this Administration. (144)
Samuel described the motives of the cyrstallising pro-Government minority party in the following terms: They are anxious for a quiet life, and do not want to engage in political struggles. They wish to grow richer, and think that British control and guidance for the time being at all events, are best calculated to make the country more prosperous and themselves with it. Some as I have mentioned, are more largely animated by antagonisms in the Opposition camp. Some think that they may obtain advantages, direct or indirect, by standing well with the Government. (145)
The Christian Arabs were prominent in the ranks of the anti-Zionist
movement in Palestine as well as in the ranks of the Moderate Party. In general they were inclined to take a less rigid anti-Government attitude after the Kemalist victories and the revival of Pan-Islarnic ideas. The fact that they occupied a high proportion of Government posts in Palestine also contributed to their moderation vis-à-vis Britain. Nevertheless, a number of Christian-Arab intellectuals were among the most active and eloquent anti-Zionists in Palestine.
Samuel attributed Palestinian opposition to Britain to three currents of thought: Arab Nationalism, anti-Zionism and Pan-Islamism. These currents attracted men of varying standards of sincerity and zeal.
There is a nucleus of genuine patriots, who would be willing to make considerable sacrifices for their cause. There are a number of young men who take pleasure in the excitement and interest of a political movement. There is a large fringe, who sympathises in general with Arab and Oriental views. ..they are ready to close their shops, if they are shop-keepers, when asked to do so by the Central Committee on some occasion of political protest, and they are willing to join a crowd in the street to speed a parting delegation or to welcome its return. (146)
By the end of 1923 there was a growing belief among the Palestinian Arab majority that Britain and the Mandate were the real protectors of Zionism, and that the JNH policy represented the convergence of British imperial interests with Zionist colonialism in Palestine, which was bound to lead to a Jewish majority and supremacy and the eventual
eviction of the Palestinian Arabs from their country .The Husseini and the Muslim-Christian leadership, consistently and consciously, refused to commit themselves to any platform which would imply the ends through cooperation with the Government instead of by opposition. (143)
The hand of the new Party was strengthened following the refusal of the Executive Committee to accept the recommendations of a Cabinet Committee formed during the summer of 1923 to review British policy in Palestine. Although some of the Committee's members thought that the Balfour Declaration was both unnecessary and unwise, the Committee found it impossible for any Government to extricate itself from the Declaration without a substantial sacrifice of consistency and self-respect.
By the time the Palestine Mandate was brought into full operation by the League's Council Resolution of 29 September 1923, the attitude of the three parties of the Palestinian Triangle had already crystallised.
The British Government stood firmly by the Balfour Declaration and the JNH policy, guided by the theory of 'dual obligation " and the principle of the 'economic absorptive capacity' on immigration policy.
The final settlement of the Mandate removed all shades of uncertainty and precluded any possibility of drastic change of British policy in Palestine for the foreseeable future.
The Zionists were satisfied that the articles of the Palestine Mandate and British policies in Palestine were conducive to the achievement of their immediate basic aim; namely, the attainment of a Jewish majority, and thus political supremacy, through immigration and land settlement. They were opposed to representative institution and the application of the principle of self-determination in Palestine on the grounds that the Arab majority would use such institutions to fight Zionism and revoke the Mandate. The Anglo-Zionist convergence was demonstrated by the Zionist acceptance of Churchill's White Paper and embodied in the person of Herbert Samuel himself.
Samuel accurately assessed the Arab position in a perceptive report submitted during January 1924. He said: The large majority of the population of Palestine is Moslem Arabs, and among them, a majority possibly equally large, favour the general views of what may be termed the local opposition to the Palestine policy of His Majesty's Government as applied by this Administration. (144)
Samuel described the motives of the cyrstallising pro-Government minority party in the following terms: They are anxious for a quiet life, and do not want to engage in political struggles. They wish to grow richer, and think that British control and guidance for the time being at all events, are best calculated to make the country more prosperous and themselves with it. Some as I have mentioned, are more largely animated by antagonisms in the Opposition camp. Some think that they may obtain advantages, direct or indirect, by standing well with the Government. (145)
The Christian Arabs were prominent in the ranks of the anti-Zionist movement in Palestine as well as in the ranks of the Moderate Party. In general they were inclined to take a less rigid anti-Government attitude after the Kemalist victories and the revival of Pan-Islamic ideas. The fact that they occupied a high proportion of Government posts in Palestine also contributed to their moderation vis-à-vis Britain. Nevertheless, a number of Christian-Arab intellectuals were among the most active and eloquent anti-Zionists in Palestine.
Samuel attributed Palestinian opposition to Britain to three currents of thought: Arab Nationalism, anti-Zionism and Pan-Islamism. These currents attracted men of varying standards of sincerity and zeal.
There is a nucleus of genuine patriots, who would be willing to make considerable sacrifices for their cause. There are a number of young men who take pleasure in the excitement and interest of a political movement. There is a large fringe, who sympathises in general with Arab and Oriental views...they are ready to close their shops, if they are shopkeepers, when asked to do so by the Central Committee on some occasion of political protest, and they are willing to join a crowd in the street to speed a parting delegation or to welcome its return. (146)
By the end of 1923 there was a growing belief among the Palestinian Arab majority that Britain and the Mandate were the real protectors of Zionism, and that the JNH policy represented the convergence of British imperial interests with Zionist colonialism in Palestine, which was bound to lead to a Jewish majority and supremacy and the eventual eviction of the Palestinian Arabs from their country .The Husseini and the Muslim-Christian leadership, consistently and consciously, refused to commit themselves to any platform which would imply the acceptance of the Balfour Declaration on the one hand, but also refused to promote or condone any revolutionary course against the Anglo-Zionist convergence on the other. The latter stand could be attributed to the dread of British military might, as well as to belief that revolution would inevitably be detrimental to their own interests. Their failure to adhere to' a revolutionary platform did not lead to the emergence of a revolutionary leadership from among the middle-class militant nationalists. Thus, the 'lower strata' of the Palestinian society, which was potentially willing to revolt was left leaderless and a long period of stagnation ensued.
Notes
1923,CO 733{41,p.3.
129.Mosques and occasionally churches were used as an effective political platform by the Arab national movement in Palestine, and the Administration protested against the use of places of devotion for purposes of political propaganda. Ibid., p.6.
130. Ibid., Appendix C. For arrangements made for boycotting the elections, see Appendix D.
131. Samuel to Devonshire, 11 February 1923, CO 733{42.
132. Monthly Political Report, March 1923, Samuel to Devonshire, 13 April 1923,CO 733{44, Appendix E.
133. Ibid. p.6.
134. Monthly Political Report, April 1923, Samuel to Devonshire, 15 May 1923, CO 733{45, p.4.
135.For details of the developments and the complications of the Advisory Council, see Samuel to Devonshire, 15 June 1923, CO 733{35.
136. For a comprehensive 'Summary of the proceedings of the Sixth Palestine Arab Congress', see Clayton to Devonshire, 22 June 1923, CO 733{46.
137.Ibid.
138.Monthly Political Report, June 1923, op.cit., pp.8-9.
139.lbid.
140.lbid., p.10.
141.Monthly Political Report, August 1923, Clayton to Devonshire, 13 September 1923,CO 733{49, p.l.
142. Clayton to Devonshire, 24 August 1923, CO 733/48.
143. Monthly Political Report, September 1923, Samuel to Devonshire, 19
October 1923, CO 733/50.
144. Samuel to Thomas, 25 January 1924, CO 733/63, p.l.
145. Ibid., p.2.
146. Samuel to Shuckburgh, 6 October 1922, CO 733/38.