PALESTINE A MODERN HISTORY
Abdul Wahab Said Al Kayyali
DEADLOCK: 1920-1923
Chapter 4
Part 2
The Role of the Notables
In a report to Churchill, Samuel attributed the outbreaks to political and economic considerations aggravated by the increase of Zionist immigration. The Arabs, Samuel added, demanded representative institutions and regarded the Administration as unduly autocratic. (57) Furthermore, the delay in the ratification of the Mandate 'has been an important factor in preventing the quiet settlement of the country. (58)
Samuel conveyed his feeling of gratitude for the leaders of the' Arab Nationalist Movement', i.e. leaders of the Haifa Congress and of the Muslim-Christian Associations, who used their best efforts to calm agitation. ..If the political leaders had set themselves to foster, instead of to check, the present agitation, the whole country could have been thrown into a state of turmoil, and order would have been reestablished only with the greatest difficulty. (59)
Another indication of
the role played by the notables was their attitude towards the
reactions of the Palestinian populace against the Jewish boycott of Arab
traders in May 1921. The notables were bound to be discredited in view of their
failure to play the role the majority of Palestinians demanded of them: During
the month a boycott of all Jewish goods broke out. The notables are stated to
have done their best to stop it but met with much difficulty; such a step being
interpreted by the people as having been prompted by the Jews and tended
consequently to decrease the prestige of the notables in the eyes of the public.
(60)
Samuel proposed to deport Bolsheviks, to suspend Jewish immigration temporarily, (61) to regulate immigration on stricter grounds, and to look into 'the very early establishment of representative institutions'. (62) Lastly, Samuel informed Churchill that he viewed with favour the impending visit of a Palestinian delegation to Europe and London and thought that efforts should be made to promote an understanding between them and the Zionist organisation. In another report Samuel recommended to Churchill that Article 4 of the Palestine Mandate, which recognised the Zionist Organisation as an advisory body to the Administration, should be watered down or rendered unobjectionable to the Arabs by the insertion of a similar article providing for the parallel recognition of a non-Jewish body. (63)
Who Opposed
Democracy?
Unlike Samuel, Churchill was not willing to conciliate the Palestinian leaders by means of political concessions, even after they had demonstrated a cooperative attitude under tense conditions and trying circumstances. He was particularly averse to giving way to Palestinian Arab demands regarding elected representative institutions. (64) When the Zionists got wind of what Samuel was contemplating, they hastened to convey their strong opposition to any form of representative institutions, stressing once more the identity of British and Zionist interests.
Such a body as appears to be contemplated would at the present time in all probability prove to be unfriendly to British policy in general and the Jewish National home in particular. (65)
The events of the spring of 1921 demonstrated that the notables were in need of establishing their leadership in the country .A show of political solidarity on a wide scale was necessary, and the Fourth Palestine Arab Congress was convened in Jerusalem in May 1921, under the traditional chairmanship of Musa Kazem. About a hundred delegates attended and reaffirmed the resolutions passed by the Haifa Congress and nominated a Palestine Arab Delegation to plead the Palestine Arab case in Europe and London. 'Pending the departure of this Delegation and its discussions in London, instructions have been given that all disorderly movements are to be avoided'. (66)
During June 1921, a more peaceful mood in Palestine prevailed. There were two major reasons for this change, although, as Samuel observed, the 'causes of unrest remain '. (67)
The first reason was Samuel's important speech at an Assembly of notables on the occasion of the King's Birthday, 3 June, when he reinterpreted the meaning of the Balfour Declaration in a way designed to allay the fears of the Palestinian Arabs and promote tranquility in Palestine. Samuel promised the Palestinians that Britain 'would never impose upon them a policy which that people had reason to think was contrary to their religious, their political and their economic interest'. (68)
Samuel's pronouncement had an unfavourable reception in Zionist circles. Its effect on the Palestinian Arabs was more difficult to gauge. The 'extremists' were not appeased, as nothing less than the withdrawal of the Balfour Declaration or even the abolition of the British Mandate would satisfy them. The greater public, though reassured, 'feel very suspicious of the Administration's intention or ability to carry them out'. (69) Samuel admitted that the Palestinians had expected a declaration more far-reaching and more specific in its terms.
The second factor was the impending departure of the Delegation to Europe, and the deliberate cooling-off policy adopted by the political leadership of the Palestine Congress: ...if the leaders of the opposition to Zionism were at any time to set themselves to fan the ambers, they would soon begin to glow, and perhaps burst into flame. Their influence is being exerted, for the time being at least on the side of tranquility. (70)
Samuel was aware of the precarious position of the Palestinian political leadership. He pointed out to Churchill that latest events revealed the great interest in public affairs in the minds of the population in general , peasants, beduins and the uneducated, and their discovery of their power to resist and obstruct the Government were an important new factor to consider. Furthermore, the Arabs possessed another weapon against the Government, namely, that of passive resistance. Should the British Government snub the Delegation, Samuel warned that the turbanned class, the Muslim religious leaders, who had hitherto been 'mere spectators’, would step in to take the place of the politicians in leading agitation and rebellion against the Government's policy.
The conclusion is that a serious attempt must be made to arrive at an understanding with the opponents to the Zionist policy, even at the cost of considerable sacrifices. The only alternative is a policy of coercion, which is wrong in principle and likely to prove unsuccessful in practice. (71)
An understanding with the Delegation was not only urgent and necessary, Samuel added, but was also possible. Speaking of the members of the Delegation, he reassured the Colonial Secretary, 'I am informed that their present attitude is by no means uncompromising'. (72)
Despite the upholding of Martial Law in the district of Jaffa and the arming of the Jewish Colonies, the resumption of immigration produced some effervescence 'and the boatmen at the Port (of Jaffa) have given much trouble in connection with the landing of Jewish travellers'. (73) Nonetheless, Samuel expected the country to remain quiet so long as the Delegation was in England.
Meantime certain sections are proceeding with the formation of a more moderate party, which, while not concealing its dislike of the Zionist Policy, emphasises rather the need for domestic reform, particularly, in the interests of the population of the villages. (74)
The idea of co-operating with a Government committed to a JNH policy was not altogether new among a section of the political notability. In May 1921, the Mayors of Jerusalem, Tulkarem and Jaffa, the Muftis of Acre and Safad and the Qadi of Jerusalem received British decorations 'for services rendered in Palestine'. Furthermore, the battle over the Muftiship renewed and intensified old family feuds, particularly between the Nashashibis and the Husseinis. Zionist efforts and money to promote discord and disunity among the Palestinian political leaders constituted a contributing factor to the idea of a 'moderate party'. In a letter to the Zionist Executive, Eder had the following to report; I am still in negotiation with Arabs. There are various moves on. If I had money something might still be done. ..There is just a possibility of being able to send a second delegation in opposition to the first. (75)
Neither a moderate party nor a second delegation was necessary at that stage, from the British point of view. The delegates were showing signs of eagerness to come to an agreement with the Government and hinted that they may even agree to an implicit acceptance of the Balfour Declaration in principle. (76)
The Delegation's moderation, however, did, not represent the political mood of the population. A confidential Government report assessing the political atmosphere in July 1921 spoke at length about waning Government prestige, public insecurity and the explosiveness of the whole situation: There is a consensus of opinion that a rising cannot be postponed much beyond the return of the Delegation from Europe should they come back empty handed. (79)
The report concluded that 'nothing short of a modification of the Jewish policy and the establishment of some form of proportional representation will ease the situation '.
After a short visit to Cairo, the Delegation went to Rome where they were received in audience by the Pope who expressed sympathy with their cause. They then proceeded to London where they found out that Parliament was not in session. Three members of the Delegation returned to Geneva to put the Palestine Arab case before the League of Nations and protest against the Zionists clauses in the draft Mandate.
These delegates also participated in a coordinated general Arab propaganda effort in Geneva. (78) On their return to England they launched a general propaganda campaign and engaged 'the services of an Advertising and Press Agency'. (79)
One day before Churchill received the first memorandum from the Arab Delegation, he raised the Palestine Question before the Cabinet.
The situation in Palestine causes me perplexity and anxiety. The whole country is in ferment. The Zionist policy is profoundly unpopular with all except the Zionists. Both Arabs and Jews are armed and arming, ready to spring at each other's throats. ..In the interests of the Zionist policy, all elective institutions have so far been refused to the Arabs, and they naturally contrast their treatment with that of their fellows in Mesopotamia.
It seems to me that the whole situation should be reviewed by the Cabinet. (80)
In their first memorandum to Churchill the Delegation reiterated the Palestinian national demands (81) and during the second half of August, the Delegation had two lengthy interviews with Churchill and Major Young of the ME Department. Churchill stressed that he was receiving them as an unofficial body and that as long as they insisted that the Balfour Declaration should be repudiated there was nothing to say. The Declaration, he argued, had to be carried out, and the Arabs must accept the fact. But they could see that it was not carried out in a manner to injure the Arabs, and try and find some basis for a friendly arrangement for the next few years. (82)
The Delegation submitted that while they still had confidence in the British Government and their sense of justice, they felt that Palestinian rights were being carried away. They had to come to London to discuss the root of the problem, the Balfour Declaration, with those who could bring about a change of policy. When the Delegation entered into a discussion of ways and means of protecting Arab rights and interests, Churchill made it quite evident that any representative elective assembly or council would have no power over the control of immigration or any other matter that was vital to the implementation of the JNH policy. Thereupon, the Delegation declared that the two parts of the Balfour Declaration were irreconcilable as Zionism was incompatible with Arab rights.
On the following day the same stumbling blocks were encountered, and Churchill pressed on the Delegation to meet Weizmann and other Zionist leaders, to see if they could work out an agreement under the auspices of the Colonial Office. The Delegation was unwilling to accept this particular suggestion, as they did not recognise Weizmann and the Zionist Organisation. Besides, 'The people of the country do not wish us to parley with them. They sent us to the Government'. (83) Churchill insisted that the Delegation should take up his suggestion and convince him that they were making an effort to come to an agreement as a preliminary condition to arranging an interview with the Prime Minister. The Delegation asked that they be given the opportunity to consult with each other before answering Churchill's request.
Before the Delegation could decide on its course of action in London, the High Commissioner summoned twenty-nine members of the 'Moslem and Christian Consultative Committee' to a meeting in Jerusalem in an apparent effort to undermine the position of the Delegation in London. The declared aim of the meeting was to invite the Palestinian Arabs to express their views on the terms of the impending Constitution being prepared by the British Government. The spokesman for those present replied that it was premature to consider a constitution at all since the status of the country had not been settled, that they could not in any case approve a constitution embodying the Balfour Declaration, and that the Delegation then in London was the body to be consulted on these matters. (84)
Apart from informal conversations between Shuckburgh, Head of the ME Department and individual members of the Delegation, there were no formal contacts between the Delegation and the Colonial Office from 1 September to 15 October. In the course of these conversations Shuckburgh found the Delegates agreeable but noncommittal. Although offended by Churchill 's suggestion that they should get into communication with the Zionist Organisation, Shuckburgh gathered the impression that they would not be unwilling to meet the Zionists under official auspices at the Colonial Office. (85)
On 24 October, the Delegation addressed a letter to Churchill, which they wanted put before the Cabinet. In this letter they reiterated the fears of 93 per cent of the People of Palestine regarding Zionist policies and maintained that: The very serious and growing unrest among the Palestinians arises from their absolute conviction that the present policy of the British Government is directed towards evicting them from their country in order to make it a national state for immigrant Jews. .. The Balfour Declaration was made without (us) being consulted and we cannot accept it as deciding our destinies.
What they suggested, or demanded, among other things, was that: The Declaration should be superseded by an Agreement which would safeguard the rights, interests and liberties of the People of Palestine, and at the same time make provision for reasonable Jewish religious aspirations, but precluding any exclusive political advantages to them, which must necessarily interfere with Arab rights. (86)
Should their suggestions and views be favourably received by the Cabinet, the Delegation was ready to enter into negotiations with HMG regarding the details of the scheme, which would subsequently be submitted to the people of Palestine.
After much hesitations (87) and as a result of discussion with Churchill, the Delegation agreed to attend a meeting in the Colonial Office where the Zionists would be present. In a telegram to Samuel, Churchill claimed that the accepted aim of the meeting was 'to discuss the possibility of making working arrangements, (88) between the Delegation and the Zionists. In contradistinction to that version, Weizmann wrote Deedes that the Arabs 'had come, not to discuss practical details, but to hear a statement of policy as promised '. The meeting was a failure. 'They entrenched themselves behind this position and Mr. Shuckburgh was unable to dislodge them. (89)
As the negotiations dragged on in London, the Palestinians lost hope of obtaining any decisive gain through diplomatic efforts. In December Weizmann passed reports, which he considered accurate, to Shuckburgh on secret Arab political meetings that took place in Palestine during September 1921. These reports revealed a number of facts about the composition, aims and tactics of the anti-Zionist Palestinian Arab national movement at that particular period.
These reports covered meetings that took place in Hebron, Ramleh, Loubie and Tulkarem where delegates from the neighbouring villages and towns participated. The meetings provided an opportunity for coordination and cooperation between the national leadership in the cities and political activists in the rural areas. The reports indicate that the direct reason for convening the secret meetings of September 1921 was the realisation that the Arab Delegation in London stood no chance of obtaining their demands and that necessary action should be taken in Palestine. As the Arabs were too weak to confront the British troops in Palestine, there seemed to be 'only one effective method to stop immigration and to destroy the Balfour Declaration, and that is a systematic series of attacks on the Jews in Palestine'. (90 The neighbouring nationalist committees in the towns had convened the respective assemblies attended by 30 to 50 delegates to decide whether it would be possible to prepare in the next three or four months a systematic series of attacks upon the Jewish colonies in their vicinity. These attacks were designed to frighten Jewish immigration, to convince the British that the Arabs were stubborn and meant to stick to their demands and to show the world that the Palestinian demands were just, and: As a result of this the League of Nations will not sign the Mandate'. (91)
These reports revealed the basis of agitation and the grounds for resentment against the Jews. We have seen how the political factor was considered important, but the economic factor, closely connected with the political one, was equally relevant: We must not allow a Mandate over us, as then all the rich Jews would grab everything in their hands, our commerce will be destroyed, we shall not be able to stand competition, they have many banks, and these banks assist only Jews, they are looking for concessions which will ruin US. (92)
In another meeting a similar line of argument stood out, this time with greater emphasis on aspects which explain the tough opposition of educated and semi-educated Arab middle classes to Zionism, who provided a high percentage of the leadership of the militant wing of the anti-Zionist Movement in Palestine: We must get rid of Jewish domination over us. The Jews are occupying important Government posts an over the land, and the Arabs are forced out everywhere. There is a general attempt by the Jewish intelligentsia to seize all the official Government positions. We must not allow this to continue. If the Balfour Declaration will be signed, we shall remain slaves to the Jews forever. (93)
At the meeting at Loubie (near Tiberias) the incompatibility of the Balfour Declaration with Arab political rights was stressed, and the generation gap clearly spelt out as the old Sheikhs, i.e. elderly people, were opposed to the younger generation 's violent tactics. 'These old Sheikhs do not understand that they are playing with out future, but fortunately they do not have much influence.' (94)
Although the fellahin were reported to be rather 'tired of politics', the activists were sure of their participation in attacks on Jewish colonies if they were assured that the Jews were not as well-armed as they say they were.
The participants in those meetings agreed to prepare the population for future attacks, to collect information on the amount of arms the Jews possess, and to propagate among the military officers (British) that they should remain passive during future attacks.
The Zionists endeavoured to counter the activists by a concerted effort to divide the Palestinian ranks by establishing 'Moslem National Societies’ and, later, 'National Christian Societies'.
The object of these Societies is stated to be to work with the Government and promote good relations between the different sections of the community. (95)
Zionist efforts in this direction failed to achieve the desired results as all Arabs who were associated with these Societies were considered by the Arab Press and the Palestinians as traitors. (96)
Samuel viewed these Societies with misgivings, as it was public knowledge 'that these Societies have been established largely owing to Jewish influence', (97) and to the influence of Mr. Kalvarisky (a Jewish member of the Advisory Council) in particular.
Sensing a resurgent fighting mood among the Palestinians owing to an accumulation of political and economic frustrations, the High Commissioner resumed his efforts to gain political advantage by conciliating Muslim opinion through relegating Muslim control over Muslim Religious Affairs (Awqaf, Shari'a (courts, etc.). (98)
Towards the end of October the 'Palestine Committee in Egypt', issued a leaflet calling upon the people of Palestine to desist from work, to close their shops and to mourn the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. Although orders were given for the seizure of the leaflet where found, it had obtained a wide circulation in Palestine whereupon strict security measures were taken to prevent disturbances throughout Palestine. Arab notables in Jerusalem and Jaffa undertook, as far as lay in their power, to prevent protestations. In spite of these precautions and undertakings a disturbance took place in Jerusalem on the morning of the Declaration 's anniversary.
When 'Arab roughs' appeared in the Jaffa road, they were dispersed by the police but soon after gathered for an attack on the Jewish quarter which was averted by the police. Shots were exchanged between the Arab crowd and a crowd of Jews inside the Jewish quarter. Thereafter troops patrolled the city and the Governor, accompanied by the 'principal Moslem notables walked through the streets and restored order'. (99) Five Jews and three Arabs were killed and thirty-six persons were wounded. Although there were no disturbances in other cities, the atmosphere was tense throughout Palestine. On the following day the political notables of Jerusalem publicly disassociated themselves from the 'unseemly and ill-advised' behaviour of irresponsible youths on 2 November. However, these notables found themselves compelled to protest against the nature of the Court set up to deal with the disturbances, and the unduly harsh sentences passed against the Arabs by it, in contrast with the lenient sentences against the Jews.
A show of mild defiance to the Government by the notables was staged at a meeting held in Jerusalem on II November. The Muslim-Christian Society unanimously decided not to obey the Ordinance conferring upon Governors the power to exact a bond of security for good behaviour from those suspected of political or other offences.
These protestations notwithstanding, the political notables appeared in the eyes of the Palestinian public as failing their duty to lead opposition to Zionism and British Zionist policies. In the aftermath of the November disturbances the Government's Intelligence Service had reported that, A somewhat disquieting feature is a tendency of the populace to act apart from the notables and to disregard their advice' (100)
Notes:
57. Samuel to Churchill, 8 May 1921, op.cit.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., p.4.
60. Monthly Political Report, May 1921, op.cit., p.2.
61. By 10 May 1921, this had been enforced. See Commander-in.Chief to Secretary of the Admiralty, 10 May 1921, CO 733/9.
62. Monthly Political Report, May 1921, op.cit., p.2.
63. Samuel to Churchill, 24 May 1921, CO 733/3.
64. Churchill to Samuel, 14 May 1921, CO 733/3.
65. Zionist Organisation, Central Office to CO, I June 1921, CO 733/16.
66. Monthly Political Report, June 1921, Samuel to Churchill, 7 July 1921, CO 733/4.
67. Ibid.
68. 'Sir Herbert Samuel's speech delivered at Jerusalem, June 3, 1921', CO to
FO 28 June 1921, FO 371/6375.
69. Samuel to Churchill, 13 May 1921, CO 733/3.
70. Monthly Political Report, June 1921, op.cit.
71. ibid., p.6.
72. Ibid.
73. Monthly Political Report, June 1921, Samuel to Churchill, 7 July 1921, CO 733/4, p.2.
74. Ibid., p.l.
75. Eder to Zionist Executive, 4 June 1921, CZA, Z4/16151, p.5.
76. See 'Interviews between four members of the Haifa Congress Delegation and
His Excellency the High Commissioner', 23 June 1921, CO 733/4. The Delegation however maintained that they rejected any institution that should imply the acceptance of the Declaration. See' A Manifesto from the Arab Delegation', 29 July 1921,CO 733/16.
77. 'Situation in Palestine', July 1921, CO 733/13, p.l.
78. For these joint efforts see A 'amal al-Wafd al-Suri al-Falastini (The Activities of the Syrian-Palestinian Delegation), Cairo, 1923.
79. Letter from Shibli Jamal (London) to Dr. Shatara, 24 August 1921, Lloyd George Papers.
80. Palestine, 'Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies' 11 August
1921, CO 733/14. The Cabinet reviewed the memorandum but decided not to
give in to Arab demands; see Cabinet 70(21). 18 August 1921, CO 733/14.
81. 'A Brief Statement of Demands of the Arab people of Palestine. ..Arab Palestine Delegation in London, 12 August 1921,CO 733/14,p.2.
82. 'Notes of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and Members of the
Palestine Arab Delegation', 22 August 1921, CO 733/14, p.2.
83. 'Shorthand Writer's Report of the Conversation between the Right Hon.Winston Churchill and Members of the Palestine Arab Delegation', 23 August 1921, CO 733{17B, p.15.
84. Samuel to Churchill, 26 August 1921, CO 733/5.
85. ' Arab-Zionist relation " Inter-Departmental note, Shuckburgh to Sir J .
Masterton Smith, 15 October 1921, CO 733/6. Later Shuckburgh complained lock: 1920-1923
92. Ibid., p.l.
93. Ibid., Jaffa report, p.2.
94. Ibid., Tiberias report, p.3.
95. Monthly Political Report, October 1921, Samuel to Churchill, 4 November 1921,CO 733/7.
96. See Monthly Political Report, ApIil1922, Deedes to ChUIChill, 10 May 1922,
CO 733/21, p.2. Also see Darwaza, op.cit., pAl.
97. Samuel to Churchill, 18 November 1921, CO 73311.
98. See Samuel to Churchill, 8 October 1921, CO 733/6.
99. Samuel to Churchill, 2 November 1921, CO 733/7 .For a full report on these disturbances see Deedes to Churchill, 29 December 1921, CO 733/8.
100. 'Summary of Intelligence', No.31, November 1921, CO 733/17B.