PALESTINE A MODERN HISTORY
Abdul Wahab Said Al Kayyali
DEADLOCK: 1920-1923
Chapter 4
Part 1
The Jerusalem outbreak of April 1920 attracted the attention of the San Remo Conference to the Arab-Zionist conflict in Palestine. Far from bringing about a review of Britain's JNH policies, the Conference nominated Great Britain as Mandatory in Palestine whose duties were defined by a verbatim repetition of the Balfour Declaration.
It was not until April 1920 (three days after the Mandate nomination), that the Declaration itself was officially disclosed by the Military Administration to the people of Palestine.(1) Five days later, the San Remo decisions were announced to the notables of Nablus. Despite Allenby's grave warnings (2) and despite legal considerations arising from the delay in the ratification of the Peace Treaty, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet approved a Zionist suggestion that Herbert Samuel be the first High Commissioner in Palestine (3).
Between the San Remo nomination in April 1920 and September 1923 when the Palestine Mandate was brought into full operation, the respective attitudes of the three parties to the Palestine problem hardened and crystallised. The Mandate provisions transferred the British Zionist accord, as embodied in the Balfour Declaration, from a love affair built on mutual interest into an internationally sanctioned Catholic marriage, where Britain was committed to a JNH policy in return for Zionist cooperation and backing in Palestine.
Following the official announcement of the Balfour Declaration and the San
Remo decision, a wave of Palestinian Arab protests against these policies and
against the separation of Palestine from Syria swept Palestine (4) and
manifestations of anxiety and restiveness abounded. Several major clashes
between Arab tribes and the British garrisons along the Beisan-Samakh frontier
with Syria took place, where heavy
casualties on both sides were inflicted.
On 6 May Fata al-'Arab of Damascus, reported that 'Muslims and Christians are convening more political meetings, which may result in protestations against the British policy that helped divide Syria'.
Four days later al-Karmal reported that 'delegates were sent to Galilee and Acre to urge the inhabitants to assist in the Jerusalem Conference'.
Indignant as the Palestinians were at British pro-Zionist policies, the Palestinian political notability sought with energy and determination to avoid a head-on collision with the British authorities in the course of the fight against Zionism. The Palestinian leadership aimed at bringing about a change of British policy (in Palestine) through a show of (peaceful) determination and friendly persuasion.
In an article on the composition and purpose of the proposed Congress, al-Karmal reflected the prevalent strategy of the Muslim-Christian Associations' leadership vis-à-vis the, Anglo-Zionist convergence in Palestine. 'The British Government is strong and therefore it is difficult to fight it. We must confine our revolt against our opponents'. (5)
Conciliatory gestures notwithstanding, the British authorities prohibited the convention of the Palestine Second Congress for security reasons.
A minority of the political notability went to the length of co-operating
with the Zionists. In accordance with a secret Zionist programme drawn up by
Weizmann, (6) Dr. Eder of the Zionist Commission concluded a deal with the
editor of al-Akhbar for £P 125.
He also concluded deals for larger sums of money with Sa'id Bey Nablusi and
Rashid Abu Khadra of Jaffa and Haidar Bey Tuqan of Nablus. This particular
Zionist drive failed and Palestinian protests against the collaborators were
reported by Eder's liaison officer.' It was this episode that prompted al-Karmal's
call on 14 May 1920, for national unity 'in order to influence public opinion to
see that landowners do not sell their land to the Jews'.
The announcement of Samuel's appointment as High Commissioner came as a severe shock to the Palestinians. Following a comprehensive tour in May, General Bols recorded: They are convinced that he will be a partisan Zionist and that he represents a Jewish and not British Government. (8)
In the same report Bols spoke of 'definite signs of Bolshevik propaganda and ideas', however, neither the Poale Zion (Workers of Zion) nor the Socialist Workers' Party (Communist Party) had any great following among the Arab proletariat workers and peasants. A pamphlet by the Poale Zion accused the Zionist leaders of 'poisoning the soul of the Jewish workers against the uncultured fellah and of waging economic war against those who have nothing'. (9) The Socialist Workers' Party 'remained exclusively Jewish up to late 1920 and the Communists had great difficulty in finding, not only Arab candidates for party membership but even sympathisers and potential allies', (10)
As the date for the introduction of civil government drew nearer, Palestinian Arab protests against the Sam Remo decisions and the appointment of Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner became more vehement. Faisal begged A1lenby to urge the British Government 'to reverse a decision which vitally affects both interests and amour propre of Arab population'.(11)
Opposition to Samuel's appointment was not confined to diplomatic notes: 'rumours of intended Arab raids on June 30th, with intention of impressing Sir Herbert Samuel. Further reports that attempts to assassinate him are intended '.(12) The Zionists gave information regarding an alleged impending outbreak at the end of Ramadan.(13) When Samuel arrived on 30 June 1920, he found the Military Authorities nervous 'and had made the most formidable preparations against any possible eventuality'.(14)
Samuel's Two-pronged Policy
Prior to his arrival Samuel had decided to adopt a two-pronged policy
devised to bring about Palestinian Arab acquiescence to Britain's JNH policy in
Palestine. On the one hand he intended to bring home to the Arabs that the
gradual establishment of the national home for the Jews in Palestine was a chose
jugee as far as HM Government were concerned.(15) On the other hand Samuel
intended to win over the moderate Palestinians, i.e. vested interests, by a
display of personal friendliness, political liberalism and impartiality within
the framework of the Balfour Declaration.
Soon after his arrival, Samuel summoned the notables of Jerusalem and the neighbouring districts to a meeting on 7 July and those of Haifa on the following day. The Palestinian national movement, which had earlier declared that the Palestinians cannot recognise Herbert Samuel whom they regarded as a Zionist leader,(16) called for a oycott: for a few days, and in certain districts some of the leading men were wavering as to the course they would pursue, in the end with exceedingly few exceptions they all attended.(17)
The failure of the boycott exposed the timidity of the political otability in Palestine. At both of these assemblies, Samuel read a message from the King to the people of Palestine and delivered speeches promising freedom and equality for all religions, good administration and economic development, and declared an amnesty for all who were in prison on account of the Easter disturbances in Jerusalem. Furthermore, Samuel disclosed his plans for a 'first stage in the development of self-governing institutions'.
The 'Advisory Council' was a step calculated to permeate a feeling of participation in the government, and a channel of peaceful expression of feelings that would help avert sudden and violent political explosions. In his report to the Foreign Secretary, Samuel expressed his satisfaction at the favourable effect of his pronouncements throughout the country : '. ..the extremists will no doubt continue their criticisms'.(18)
In reply to Samuel's seemingly moderate announcements, al-Karmal pointed out the basic irreconcilability of the two injunctions of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate : We do not understand how the making of a national home for strangers in our country can be without prejudice to our religious and civil rights. We strongly protest against separating Palestine from its mother, Syria, and making it a national home for Jews and we appeal to the British Government and to the liberal British Nation for Justice.(19)
The Advisory Council foreshadowed in Samuel's inaugural address had its first meeting on 6 October 1920. It consisted of twenty members, with Samuel as Chairman, of whom half were British officials and half nominated Palestinians, seven Palestinian Arabs (four Muslims and three Christians) and three Jews.(20) The Arab members were pro-British notables with entrenched vested interests. Deedes described the first meeting of the Advisory Council as a great success in spite of the criticisms voiced by the non-official members. Furthermore, Deedes reported the presence of 'a feeling amongst a section (notably Moslem) of the population that members of the Council should be elected and not nominated'.(21)
Three weeks later the optimistic outlook of the Administration gave way to a more solemn mood. Deedes explained that the reasons for this change included a new initiative by the 'so-called Intelligentsia': 'In the East this class is almost impossible to compete with', and 'the existence of such movements, as Arab Nationalism, Pan Islamism etc.,'(22) and the necessity of dealing with certain practical questions arising out of the Zionist programme.
The Third Palestine Arab Congress
Another factor was the prospect of a Third Palestine Conference. The fall of
the 'Arab regime' in Damascus in July 1920 was a severe blow to the Palestinian
Arab national movement that had repercussions on the orientation and outlook of
that movement. The sense of identity was irreparably damaged, and an important
source of backing was suddenly cut. The Palestinians were left alone in an arena
where the balance of power was hopelessly tipped in favour of their determined
enemies. The proposed Conference was charged with the arduous task of devising a
strategy for the new situation.
The Third Palestine Arab Congress was held in Haifa on 13 December 1920, and
was attended by representatives of the Muslim-Christian Associations and
Societies from almost every part of Palestine, under the presidency of Musa
Kazem Husseini.
In the resolutions of the Congress the participants affirmed that Palestine was
included in the Arab Kingdom, which Britain promised to recognise in the
Hussein-McMahon correspondence. They declared their dissatisfaction with 'the
present form of government in that it does not satisfy their wishes and fails to
safeguard their interests'. The manifesto of the Congress pointed out, in a
somewhat circumspect manner, that the Government was illegal since it exercised
'the power of legislation without a representative Council and before the final
decision of the League of Nations is given'. (23) They objected to the
Government's recognition of the Zionist Organisation as an official body, of
Hebrew as an official language and of the use of the Zionist flag, and to
admitting Zionist immigrants. The Advisory Council was condemned as 'a false
attempt to show that there exists in Palestine a council with legislative powers
representing the population '. Furthermore, the Congress contended that too many
Zionists were appointed to various offices of Government. The manifesto
concluded by spelling out the three 'doctrines' or 'National Charter' of the
Arab National Movement in Palestine:
(I ) The condemnation of the Zionist policy which embodies the establishment
of a National Home for the Jews, based upon the Balfour Declaration.
(II) The non-acceptance of the principle of Jewish immigration.
(II) The establishment of a National representative Government.
The Congress elected an Executive Committee of moderate Palestinian notables, headed by Musa Kazem, and entrusted it with the execution of the resolutions until the following Congress was convened.
The Congress, although clearly anti-Zionist, was quite moderate vis-à-vis
the British government. The three 'doctrines' did not challenge the Mandate
outrightly, but rather concentrated on objecting against the inclusion of the
Balfour Declaration in its articles.
A state of excitement and agitation in Palestine prevailed during December and
early January. As a Congress of the Muslim-Christian Societies it was
representative of the elements that had assumed the leadership of these
Societies from 1918 onwards; namely, town and village propertied notables, (24)
merchants and a minority of middle class intellectuals. National unity meant the
lowest common denominator in the anti-Zionist camp, and the composition of the
Executive Committee was bound to reflect that. The absence of any mention of
independence and unity with Syria was a significant omission that can only be
explained in the light of the French occupation of Syria.
The demands of the Congress were not spared criticism by the younger and more vigorous elements. An article by 'Isa al-'Isa on the Haifa Congress concluded by saying that the demands of the Congress were not radical enough. (25)
Moderate as the resolutions and the leadership of the Haifa Congress were, the government maintained that the delegates were appointed by small groups of people and refused to acknowledge them as being representative of the population. Thereupon, the organisers of the Congress felt compelled to vindicate their representative character and launched a wide-spread successful campaign to demonstrate general endorsement of the resolutions and leadership of the Congress.(26) The agitation which ensued, with public meetings and leaflets, etc., helped stimulate renewed daily interest in politics and concern for the future among the Palestinians, which inevitably resulted in the revival of tension in the country .
In an attempt to allay growing apprehensions, as well as to establish personal relations with the leaders of the opposition, Samuel invited Musa Kazem and five of his political associates to Government House to discuss with him -in a private capacity -'the questions about which their minds were exercised'. Musa Kazem 'mentioned the fears of the community in regard to Mr. Balfour's statement and Jewish immigration. He also raised the question of representative government'. In the course of his reply Samuel made it clear that it was not within his competence to discuss the policy laid down by HM Government and the Balfour Declaration, but rather it was his duty to carry out these policies. However, Samuel pointed out, it was within his competence to give effect to the second part of the Balfour Declaration. The question of the election of municipalities was already receiving his close attention. Furthermore, Samuel declared that he was prepared to recognise any body of 'gentlemen' representing any important section of the community, in the same manner as he had already given recognition to the Jewish National Assembly and under the namely, that no resolutions should be adopted contrary to the conditions of the Mandate. (27) While the Palestinian leaders refrained from accepting Samuel's proposals, they responded favourably to the prospect of a friendly personal relationship with the High Commissioner and the political implications thereof.
A Feeling of Unsettlement
The revival of political agitation in the wake of the Haifa Congress owed
much to a prevalent feeling of unsettlement in the area. The victories of
Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) inspired the belief that Turkey would probably refuse to
ratify the Peace Treaty thus bringing the issue of the Mandate under fresh
consideration. Then, there was the feeling that an attempt will be made by the
Arabs to expel the French from Syria. In mid-January 1921 Deedes reported that
even 'responsible' Palestinian Arabs firmly believed 'that there is still a
chance of getting the Mandate changed and that many British Statesmen and a
portion of the British Public desires that change'. (280 In view of the many
imponderables and the ample room for agitation Deedes expressed his
apprehensions regarding the immediate political prospects: I do not feel that
there is much reason to fear the responsible members of the discontented party;
but the words and actions of the irresponsible members are apt to be dangerous
in an atmosphere always more or less charged with electricity, especially at
this time of the year when we are approaching Easter. (29)
This same feeling persisted after the text of the draft mandate was reported in the local newspapers. (30)
The February Report gave an account of a movement to collect signatures as a protest against the separation of Palestine from the rest of a region to which, it was contended, the country belongs geographically as well as ethnographically and historically. This movement, among other things, reflected, 'a renewed effort on the part of Arab Nationalists in Egypt, in Palestine and in Syria to achieve their ends by cooperation '. The Report also gave accounts of increased interest in the question of Jewish immigration into Galilee brought about by the attempts of the Haifa Congress to gain support for their resolutions.
In the neighbourhood of Beisan some anxiety and apprehension have recently been expressed by the Arab population owing to an unfortunate and unfounded impression having gained ground that the Government intends to further the settlement of Jews in a manner detrimental to the interests of the Arab population. (31)
The ownership of the Jiftlik (Imperial) Beisan lands issue had a direct bearing on the involvement of the fellahin in the political fight against the pro-Zionist policy of the Government. The fears of the fellahin were genuine in view of the complications involved in their rights to ownership and tenancy of the lands under question.
Churchill's Cairo Conference
On assuming responsibility for the Middle East Department, (32) the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, (33) summoned his
lieutenants and key British military, political and administrative staff in the
area to a Conference in Cairo.
The Conference's main aim was to review the British position and lay plans for future policy in the Middle East in the light of the French occupation of Syria and the unsettled conditions of Trans-Jordan and Mesopotamia.
As far as Palestine was concerned the Conference considered that HMG was responsible under the terms of the Mandate for establishing a national home for the Jewish people. In a 'Memorandum drawn up by Middle East Department' presented to the Cairo Conference, it was observed that the Palestine Administration was being conducted 'in strict accordance with the terms of the Mandate, and has been attended by the happiest results'. (34)
The Conference recommended that Trans-Jordan should be constituted an Arab province of Palestine under Prince 'Abdullah, Faisal's brother, responsible to the High Commissioner. It would not be included in the administrative system of Palestine, and therefore the Zionist clauses of the Mandate would not apply. In return for all this and the promise of financial assistance, Abdullah pledged, after interviews with Churchill in Jerusalem, to respect British international commitments: to the French in Syria and to the Zionists in Palestine. (35)
Soon after Churchill's intention to visit Egypt, and perhaps Palestine, became known, the Executive Committee of the Haifa Congress announced the appointment of a deputation that would proceed to Egypt and lay before Churchill the grievances of the Palestinian Arabs. Despite the Administration 's advice to await the arrival of Churchill in Jerusalem the deputation, headed by Musa Kazem, left Palestine 12 March and returned two weeks later. Churchill, reluctantly, received the deputation but refused to discus political questions on that occasion but said he would be pleased to see them in Jerusalem on 28 March. During their stay in Egypt the Palestinian leaders were invited by Syrian-Lebanese political figures to banquets and gatherings where speeches in favour of Arab unity were delivered: On the evening of the 19th the Syrian Union Party held a meeting where the possibility of joining forces with the Arab Palestinians was discussed in the interests of the complete independence of Syria. (36)
While in Cairo Musa Kazem saw Dr Ismail Bey Sidki, of the Watani Party, who advised him to form a national party in Palestine to work for complete independence. Musa Kazem's reported reply revealed the basic strategy of the Muslim-Christian Association's leadership at that stage: Musa Kazem said that the intentions of the Palestine Delegation included complete independence, but they desire, if this were not possible, that the real power should be with the English and not with the Jews; they desired also their own parliament. (37)
When Churchill visited Palestine, he found that the Palestinians were eager to convey to him their strong feelings against Zionism wherever he went. Although no official intimation of the hour of the arrival of the special train bringing the Colonial Secretary and the High Commissioner to Gaza had been received, Large and expectant crowds of people assembled and many persons came in from outlying villages.
During the visit cries of 'Long live the High Commissioner and Mr. Churchill', 'Down with Balfour', and 'we won't have the Jews' were heard. (38)
When the Governor of Haifa prohibited demonstrations on 25 March and issued warnings regarding the risks and penalties attendant upon joining in a demonstration forbidden by the Government, the demonstrators defied his orders and a collision occured with the police, one Christian boy and a Muslim were killed, one Christian injured by a bullet wound, and ten Jews injured by knives or stones and five policemen were slightly injured.
Three days later the Governor of Jaffa refused to grant permission for a peaceful demonstration. As a consequence all Muslim shops were closed in protest. On the same day in Jerusalem, a large but orderly demonstration was held to protest against the Balfour Declaration.
On 28 March, the deputation of the Executive Committee of the Haifa Congress met Churchill at Government House, Jerusalem. A comprehensive memorandum, which Churchill described as a 'very able paper', on Palestinian Arab grievances and demands was presented to the Colonial Secretary .The memorandum accused the British Government of creating the national home idea and of putting life into it and carrying it into execution even before the ratification of the Mandate by the League of Nations. It dealt with the Palestine problem from legal, historical, moral, economic and political points of view and concluded by putting forth five Palestinian Arab demands calling for the abolition of the JNH, stoppage of immigration and land sales, the establishment of a national Palestinian government, responsible to a parliament, and the non-separation of Palestine from her sister states. (39)
In his reply Churchill informed the Palestinian leaders that it was not in his power to repudiate the Balfour Declaration and to veto Jewish immigration to Palestine, which the JNH policy inevitably involved. The Balfour Declaration was a fait accompli brought about by the War that the Arabs in Palestine could do nothing about but accept. (40)
He assured his visitors that the Government fully intended to stand by the second part of the Balfour Declaration, which in fact imposed a dual obligation on the Government, 'if one promise stands so does the other'. (41)
In the light of -Churchill's offhand treatment of the Palestinian leaders, it was not surprising that the Monthly Political Report for April should have started by stating that 'The visit of the Secretary of State gave satisfaction to the Jews and brought disappointment to the Arabs'. (42)
Captain Brunton of the General Staff Intelligence in Palestine reported that Churchill's visit had added to the anxiety of the Palestinians because the Colonial Secretary 'upheld the Zionist cause and treated the Arab demands like those of a negligible opposition to be put off by a few political phrases and treated like bad children'. (43)
The heavy-handedness of the troops and the killings that took place during the Haifa demonstrations on 28 March increased hostility to the Government and strengthened unity between Christians and Muslims not only in Haifa but in other districts as well. In Beisan demonstrators protested against Zionism and Jewish immigration during Samuel's visit to the town. In Samaria the Governor reported 'increasing influence of anti-Zionist leaders over the peasantry'. (44)
Hajj Amin as Mufti
The report also made reference to an important and controversial issue: In
Jerusalem the chief topic of interest has been the election of the New Mufti;
opinion has been divided as to who should succeed Kamel Effendi al Husseini,
members of whose family (one of the most influential and respected in Palestine)
have held this office for several generations. Learned opinion, represented by
the Law Courts, has not favoured the popular candidate al Hajj Amin al Husseini,
brother of the late Mufti and the elections that were held returned to the
latter at the bottom of the poll causing indignation to the Husseini family (to
which somewhat clamorous expression has been given) to a very large section of
the inhabitants of all the districts. The Government, the Jews and the Mayor of
Jerusalem were all suspected of having influenced the election. Technical flaws
in the constitution of the electorate have delayed the settlement of this
question. (45)
Settled or not, Hajj Amin soon assumed the role of the Mufti, and it was he who invited Samuel to a luncheon on the occasion of the celebration of the carrying of the standard to Nebi Musa on 25 April.
Samuel's acceptance of the invitation implied Government's recognition of Hajj Amin as Mufti, while the latter's friendliness and courtesy to Samuel on that occasion proved that he was willing to come to terms with the Government. It soon became clear that the election was to be disregarded and Hajj Amin allowed becoming Mufti. Thus Samuel avoided alienating the Husseinis in a balancing act in accordance with recognisable traditional imperial policy.
The question of the Muftiship was an important one in view of the fact that the Mufti of Jerusalem was regarded by the Administration as the head of the Muslim community in Palestine. Furthermore, Hajj Amin was elected as Ra'is al-'Ulama' and President of the Supreme Muslim Council, which provided him with a solid power-base through the effective control over the management of religious endowments awqaf and the expenditure of income there from, the appointment and dismissal of all shari 'a (Islamic) Courts and waqf officials, as well as the nomination of qadis (Judges).
The Administration's efforts to conciliate Arab public opinion in Palestine could not possibly do away with the two grounds on which Arab opposition stood, namely, the political and the constitutional grounds. On the political level the Administration was not in a position to nullify the Balfour Declaration and the JNH policy. On the constitutional side the Palestine Administration could do nothing to hasten the final settlement of the Mandate at the Peace Conference, nor could it change its autocratic and bureaucratic character to a representative and popular one. For whereas the purpose of other mandates was preparing the natives for self-government, the Palestine Administration was committed to a policy of 'immobilism' since self-government for the Arab majority in Palestine was inconsistent with the JNH policy.
Jaffa's Revolt
Shortly after the collision between the Haifa demonstrators and the police,
an Arab was found dead in the neighborhood of a camp of Jewish immigrants, and
the situation became exceedingly explosive.
The expected outburst eventually took place in Jaffa during the first two weeks of May. This was not surprising in view of unemployment and widespread resentment against Zionist immigration and the quality of the immigrants who abounded in the Arab port. (46)
On the evening of 30 April, Communist pamphlets and leaflets in Hebrew, Yiddish and Arabic were distributed calling for a May Day cessation of work, a proletarian rising against the British and the establishment of a Soviet Palestine. (47)
On the morning of 1 May an authorised Zionist socialist (Poale Zion)
demonstration clashed with an unauthorised demonstration by some fifty
Communists carrying a red flag in Tel-Aviv, the Jewish quarter of Jaffa. The
Communists (Bolsheviks) were eventually forced out of Tel-Aviv into the mixed
Muslim and Jewish quarter of Menshiah. When the police attempted to disperse the
Bolsheviks, the Muslims
became involved and a general disturbance occurred, which soon spread to the
other parts of the town. Wild rumours of Jewish attacks enraged the Arabs.
According to Brunton, 'It is stated that the Jews first began by firing on the Arab passers-by' and that the Arabs attacked a house for the reception of Jewish immigrants. On this occasion the Muslims and Christians demonstrated their solidarity and unity in the fight against Zionism. (48)
Of greater significance was .Brunton 's reference to several incidents that occurred on the first day's rioting which caused the Arabs to suspect the impartiality of the troops and the Authorities. The instances cited by Brunton included 'the placing of Jewish guides on the armoured cars'; 'a Jewish civilian being seen and heard ordering British soldiers to fire on the crowd'; and 'the searching of Arabs by Jews in front of British soldiers'. (49) These incidents precipitated what Brunton described as a monster demonstration on 2 May, where Palestinian Arabs demanded the replacement of British troops by Indians and demanded arms to defend themselves against the armed Jews.
Troubles continued on 3 May and killing on both sides occurred, considerable damage being done to Jewish shops. Women played 'a considerable part in urging on the Arabs to attack Jews', (50) while the notables were trying to calm the population and had a very good effect '. (51)
The events that took place in Jaffa during the first three days of May galvanised the villagers in other Palestinian districts into a truculent mood. Samuel reported to Churchill that several Jewish colonies were attacked in various districts: It has been necessary to send detachments of troops, armoured cars, aeroplanes, and police to a number of different places, and to request the naval authorities to send warships to Jaffa and Haifa as a precautionary measure. (52)
The more serious clashes however occurred in the district of Jaffa. On hearing that Arabs were being killed by Jews in Jaffa, the neighbouring peasants and beduins were immediately drawn into the foray.
On the 5th May some 3,000 Arabs (according to reports) had assembled to the north of the Jewish colony of Petah Tkvah (Mulebbis) about 10 miles north of Jaffa. several hundred strong was preparing to attack from the south. (53)
Government forces repulsed the attackers and pursued them with a loss of sixty killed and many wounded. The Haycraft Commission estimated the number of killed during the Jaffa outbreak at 95, of whom 48 were Arab and 47 Jewish, and 219 wounded of whom 75 were Arab and 146 Jewish. (54) These statistics exclude some of the casualties of the 5 May attack.
Brunton informed his superiors that the Zionists were trying to substantiate a theory to the effect that the outbreak of I May 'was premeditated by the Arabs and that it was arranged by a few notables, encouraged by French intrigue'. In his opinion: Nothing could be farther from the truth. I have carefully gone into the case, and there is not a vestige of proof of French or other intrigue. On the contrary, the attitude of the French consul appears to have been all that could have been desired. There is no evidence of premeditation on the part of the Arabs. (55)
In view of his opinion that the Jaffa disturbances were not a simple outbreak of mob violence but rather an expression of a 'deep seated and widely spread popular resentment at the present British policy', Brunton found it inescapable to recommend concessions to the Arabs on Jewish immigration, or failing that increasing the garrison in order to enforce British support for Zionism in Palestine.
The Haycraft Commission were impressed by the level of crude political interest and consciousness in the Palestinian towns and villages like Tulkarem: In a small Moslem centre of this sort the people are more politically minded than a small English country town, and the discussion of politics is their chief, if not their only, intellectual occupation. (56)
Notes
1. Palin Commission Report, 1 July 1920, FO 371/5121, and p.37.
2. Allenby to Lloyd George, 6 May 1920, Lloyd George Papers, Beaverbrook
Library.
3. Weizmann, op.cit., p.352.
4. See 'Petitions of Protest', between 2 and 10 May 1920, FO 371/5120 and FO
371/5114.
5.AI-Karmal, 13 May 1920.
6. See Memorandum by Eder, 5 May 1920; Hagana Archives (HA).
7. A report addressed to Eder, 30 May 1920, Hagana-Archives (HA).
8. Bols to FO, 1 June 1920, FO 371/5114, p.2. In an effort to counter the
advantages enjoyed by the Zionists through their accessibility to the British
public, the Palestinian Arabs published a paper in English in The Times, under
the name of the Jerusalem Gazette. Its first number on 22 June was full of
bitter attacks on Zionism and Sir Herbert Samuel. See Paper submitted to the FO,
26 June 1920, FO 371/5120.
9. See Bols to FO,7 June 1920,FO 371/5114.
10. Walter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, London, 1961,
p.79. The author covers communism in Palestine throughout the Mandate period,
pp.73-19.
11. Allen by, Cairo, to FO,9 June 1920, FO 371/5120.
12. GHQ, Egypt, to WO, 23 June 1920, FO 371/5120. Also see Bols to FO, 24 June
1920, FO 371/5120 and 25 June 1920, FO 371/5114.
13. Situation in Palestine', FO Minute, 31 May 1920, FO 371/5119.
14. Samuel, Memoirs, p.154.
15. In order to make sure that the Palestine Government was in sympathy with the
JNH policy Samuel asked Syndham Deedes, of Allen by's Intelligence Staff, to
become Civil (later Chief) Secretary and Norman Bentwich to become Legal
Secretary, both of whom were pro-Zionist. Ibid., p.155.
16. See Bols to FO, 25 June 1920, FO 371/5114.
17. Samuel to Curzon, 12 July 1920, FO 371/5121, p.1.
18. Ibid., pp.1-3,pas.tim.
19. See 'Report on the Arabic Press', July 1920, FO 371/5188.
20. Edwin Montague, who was a minister and head of the India Office; protested
vehemently to Lord Curzon against the placing of the Muslims in a minority
position on the Council. See Montague to Curzon, 26 November 1920, FO 381/5124.
21. Deedes to Tilley, 10 October 1920, FO 371/5124.
22. Same to same, 1 November 1920, FO 371/5124.
23. For the English text of the resolutions see Matiel E.T. Mogannam. The Arab
Woman and the Palestine Problem, London, 1937, pp. 125-7.
24. According to the political report for December 1920, there were forty-three
Muslim-Christian Societies with a membership of around 3,000 by June 1920. See
Samuel to Curzon, 1 January 1920, Enclosure, FO 371/6374.
25. See Falastin, 20 and 27 March 1920.
26. Monthly Political Report, January 1921, Samuel to Curzon, Enclosure in No.1,
1 February 1921,FO 371/6374.
27. Ibid.
28. Deedes to Tilley, 14 January 1921, CO 733/17 A.
29. Ibid.
30. Monthly Political Report, February 1921, H.Cr. to Cunon, 1 March 1921, FO
371/6375.
31. Ibid., also see Samuel to FO, 19 February 1921, FO 371/6375.
32. Until then Palestine's affairs were the responsibility of the Foreign
Office.
33. For a general study on Churchill's favourable view of Zionism see Oskar
Rabinowicz, Winston Churchill on Jewish Problems, London, 1956. Also see an
article by Winston Churchill 'Zionism versus Bolshevism " Illustrated
Sunday Herald, 8 February 1920.
34. For a general account of the Conference see CAB 24/126.
35. Ibid., p.108.
36. Monthly Political Report, March 1921, Deedes to Churchi1l, 8 April 1921, CO
733/2, p.6.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p.2.
39. Cairo Conference, CAB 24/126, p.150. For another copy of the memorandum see
'official Report' attached to the Monthly Political Report, March 1921,op.cit.
40. Ibid.
41.lbid.,p.151.
42. Monthly Political Report, April 1921 , Deedes to Churchill, CO 733/3, p.l.
43. Report by C.D. Brunton, 13 May 1921, presented to the Cabinet in a
memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 'The Situation in
Palestine',9 June 1921 CO 33/13.
44. Ibid., p.5.
45. Ibid., p.3. For a critical account of Samuel's attitude on the appointment
of Hail Amin to the Muftiship of Jerusalem see Kedourie, Sir Herbert Samuel,
op.cit., pp.48-59.
46. On 7 May 1921, Samuel appointed a Commission of Enquiry headed by Sir Thomas
Haycraft, Chief Justice of Palestine. For the findings of the Haycraft
Commission see 'Palestine Disturbances in May 1921. Report of the Commission of
Inquiry with Correspondence relating thereto'. Cmd. 1540. 1921.
47. Brunton, 9 June 1921, op.cit., The text of the original Arabic leaflet is
quoted in my documentary "Watha'iq al Muqawama al-Falastiniyya al-'Arabiyya
dida al-lhtilal Al Biritani wa al-Sahyuniyya (Documents of the Palestinian Arab
Resistance Against British Occupation and Zionism), Beirut, 1968, pp.22-5,
hereafter referred to as Documents.
48. Brunton, 9 June 1921, op.cit.
49. Ibid., pp.2-3.
50. Ibid.
51. See 'Interim Report of the Commission of Enquiry' (Haycraft), forwarded by
Deedesto Churchill, 16 August 1921,CO 733/5,p.24.
52. Samuel to Churchill, 8 May 1921, CO 733/3, p.l. For other reports on the
reaction to the Jaffa disturbances, see monthly political Report, May 1921,
Samuel to Churchill,6 June 1921, FO 371/6375.
53. Brunton, 9 June 1921, op.cit., p.3.
54. Interim Report, October 1921, Appendix B, p.l.
55. Brunton, 9 June 1921, op.cit. The Haycraft Commission confirmed Brunton's
conclusions; see Interim Report, October 1921, Appendix A, pp.I-3.
56. Interim Report, October 1921.